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INTRODUCTION
Digital rights management ("DRM") systems, including technologi-
cal measures that are used to protect copyrighted works, are not new.
2
They have existed for at least the last couple of decades. Similarly, cir-
cumvention tools have been widely available for a long time, and it is not
uncommon for individual users to circumvent the technological measures
used to protect copyrighted works.
Those who played with computers in the early Apple II days may
still remember the wide variety of cracking software and hardware they
could obtain-Bag of Tricks, Locksmith, Wildcard, you name it. Today,
however, DRM systems have taken on greater significance because of
the growth of electronic commerce and the explosion of the Internet.
What was once fascinating to only techies and geeks is now also of great
interest to policymakers and the consuming public.
In the current DRM debate, just like in most other intellectual prop-
erty-related debates, there is a considerable divide between the rights
holders, their investors and representatives on the one hand and academ-
ics, consumer advocates, and civil libertarians on the other.3 Although
1. Cracking Techniques, http://boutillon.free.fr/Underground/Deplombage/Cracking_
Techniques/1984/1984.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2006).
2. For excellent collections of articles discussing DRM systems and related laws, see gener-
ally DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS (Eberhard Becker et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT]; Sympo-
sium, The Law and Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management-
Musings on Emerging Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 597, 619
[hereinafter Bechtold, Present and Future] ("[Olver the last few years, the DRM debate has devel-
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these two groups rarely talk to each other, each of them is convinced that
"its position is obvious and natural, whereas the other side is radical and
contrived."4 They concoct their own "doomsday scenarios" and argue
for laws and policies that vindicate their positions.5
Unfortunately, neither side has sufficient empirical evidence to ei-
ther support its position nor disprove its rivals'. Instead, as David
McGowan noted, both sides tactically push the burden of proof back and
forth, knowing full well that "[w]hoever has to prove the unprovable
facts is likely to lose.",6 As the digital economy grows, the debate inten-
sifies, and the divide between the two sides widens.
Today, there has emerged an urgent need to find the common
ground on this very divisive issue, and this Inaugural Summit and the
resulting symposium issue cannot be timelier. Although finding this
proverbial common ground has been difficult, we as academics fortu-
nately can step back from the debate to analyze the positions taken by
both sides. As a businessman once told me, "You have the luxury of
saying 'on the other hand,' but we don't. We have to make decisions."
oped into a discussion about extremes. Depending on the point of view, digital rights management is
perceived as either heaven or hell on earth."); James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What the
Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 97, 107-09 (F. Scott Kieff & John M. Olin eds., 2003) (crudely dividing the
intellectual property field into "'maximalists' or high protectionists, on the one hand, and 'minimal-
ists,' or those with a heightened concern about the public domain, on the other"); Anupam Chander
& Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004) (noting
"the increasingly binary tenor of current intellectual property debates"); R. Polk Wagner, The Per-
fect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 424 (2005) (observ-
ing the existence of "a virtual crisis for reasoned dialogue and deliberation; the gulf between advo-
cates of 'the public domain' and the content creators is so broad as to virtually preclude the sort of
discussion that could lead to mutually beneficial agreement about the policy changes that must occur
in this new era of the copyright law"); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Eco-
system, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 9 ("Today, the intellectual property debate is highly polarized.
Policymakers and commentators tend to fall into one of the two rival camps: the high-protectionists
or the low-protectionists--or in academic parlance, the maximalists or the minimalists.").
4. Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and
Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium, " 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1347 (2005) (stating that "each
side [in the debate] tries to convince the other that its position is obvious and natural, whereas the
other side's is radical and contrived").
5. See, e.g., id. at 1321 (stating that both sides in the intellectual property debate "agree that
the barbarians are at the gates, the city is under siege, and the situation is grave"); Jane C. Ginsburg,
How Copyright Got a Bad Namefor Itself 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 65 (2002) (recalling sugges-
tion that "the players in the debate over technological means of committing or forestalling copying
were all paranoid, each suspecting the other of bottomless malevolence in their respective endeavors
to control or to liberate copyrighted material"); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism,
69 MO. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (observing that "those who debate copyright often seem to talk past each
other").
6. As David McGowan observed:
It is easy for each side to poke holes in the other side's positions. It is hard for either side
to make an affirmative, instrumental case for their views. For this reason, and because
scholars favor consequentialist rhetoric, the debate often consists of competing narratives
that use hunches and conjectures to link the result an author desires to the policy the au-
thor favors. Because the evidence in such arguments is so weak, the legal endgame is to
place the burden of proof on the other side. Whoever has to prove the unprovable facts is
likely to lose.
McGowan, supra note 5, at 2.
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Fully exploiting this luxury, Part I begins by examining the posi-
tions taken by the proponents and critics of DRM systems and related
laws. Part II then focuses on anticircumvention laws, highlighting their
harms at both the domestic and international levels. Contending that an
unbalanced international anticircumvention regime is more harmful than
its domestic counterpart, this Part calls for countries, in particular less
developed countries, to be more cautious about the ratification and sub-
sequent implementation of the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") Internet Treaties. 7 Part III concludes with four observations
which I hope will provide some insight into the development of the next
generation of DRM systems and the supporting legal regime. Resuscitat-
ing this Summit's larger theme of "working together in the digital
world," this Part also seeks to find more common ground between the
many stakeholders in the DRM debate.
I. THE DRM DEBATE
In today's DRM debate, there are generally two different camps.
While rights holders, their investors and representatives are on one side,
academics (usually liberal academics), consumer advocates, and civil
libertarians are on the other. Even though these two camps disagree con-
siderably, they do agree on many issues, and their positions are not irrec-
oncilable. In addition, there are many who fall in between the two
camps, as well as those whose affiliations vary depending on the specific
issue at hand. Thus, despite the increasing polarity of the debate, it may
be misleading to explore it as if there are only two camps.
Nevertheless, to underscore the need to find common ground be-
tween the many stakeholders in the DRM debate, this Part intentionally
polarizes the positions of the pro-anticircumvention camp and the anti-
anticircumvention camp. In particular, it discusses their disagreements
over (1) where copyright law should strike the balance, (2) whether the
leakage in the current copyright system is acceptable, (3) whether the
technological measures deployed thus far by the content industries are
sufficiently effective, (4) who should sacrifice in the early DRM systems,
and (5) how society should respond to the challenge created by the Inter-
net and new media technologies to the content industries. After explor-
ing these differences, this Part concludes with a reminder that the debate
is actually more complex and dynamic than what the bipolar debate has
suggested and that stakeholders align their positions with those of others
at times while opposing them at other times.
7. WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT]; WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT].
[Vol. 84:1
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A. Where Should Copyright Law Strike the Balance?
Most members of the two camps agree that intellectual property is
valuable and that the copyright system provides the needed economic
incentives to promote creativity.8 Without copyright protection, they
understand, most professional authors and their investors will not able to
recoup the time, effort, or resources expended in the creative process,
and society will suffer as a result. Copyright therefore ensures that au-
thors participate in the creative process, rather than in other, more remu-
nerative activities.
What these two camps disagree about, however, is the amount of
incentives the copyright system needs to generate to promote creativity
and whether support for creative works should come solely from the
copyright system.9 Although an increase in copyright protection will
generally increase the authors' economic incentives to create, such incen-
tives are not the only motivation behind creative activities. For example,
I do not need economic incentives to write a thank you email to the or-
ganizers of this interesting summit, even though such an email is eligible
for copyright protection if it is original and sufficiently creative and if it
satisfies the other requirements under copyright law. Likewise, parents
do not need economic incentives to take snapshots of their children, al-
though these snapshots are also eligible for copyright protection. In fact,
if the right circumstances arise, these snapshots may be worth a large
sum of money (think Brangelina's Baby! 10).
In addition, more is not always better, and small can be beautiful. 1"
To participate in the creative process, authors need access to a richly
endowed public domain. The more protection society gives to a single
author, the less access to the copyrighted works thousands, or even mil-
lions, of future authors (and many more consumers) will have. At some
point, the lack of access to needed raw materials and the fear of copy-
right infringement lawsuits will prompt future authors to abandon their
aspiring profession.
As Judge Alex Kozinski warned us in his famous dissent in White v.
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,'2 "[o]verprotecting intellectual prop-
erty is as harmful as underprotecting it.' 3 Judge Kozinski's concern has
8. Inevitably, there are commentators who consider copyright obsolete and irrelevant in the
digital world and therefore have called for its abolition. See Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of
Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 732-33 (2005) (discussing these commentaries).
9. See id. at 733-39 (examining alternative compensation models).
10. See Julie Bosman, In Web Era, Big Money Can't Buy an Exclusive, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
2006, at CI (reporting that People Magazine paid a substantial sum for the rights to publish the
pictures of Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt cuddling their days-old infant).
11. See generally E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED (1975).
12. 989 F.2d 1512 (9thCir. 1993).
13. White, 989 F.2d at 1513 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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become particularly important today, in light of the ever-expanding
scope of intellectual property protection. Indeed, critics have repeatedly
questioned whether the existing copyright system has struck the appro-
priate balance between rights holders and the consuming public. As Jes-
sica Litman, one of the most vocal critics of the copyright industries,
stated:
There is no overarching vision of the public interest animating the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"]. None. Instead, what
we have is what a variety of different private parties were able to ex-
tract from each other in the course of an incredibly complicated four-
year multiparty negotiation. Unsurprisingly, they paid for that with a
lot of rent-seeking at the expense of new upstart industries and the
public at large. 14
Similarly, Glynn Lunney noted that "[o]rdinary consumers seldom
play any direct role in the extended (and often private) negotiating ses-
sions required to craft such compromises" and that consumer interests
are "represented only indirectly in these sessions, when it happens to
coincide with the interest of one of the participants. 15 Joseph Liu also
pointed out that the relationship between copyright and consumer inter-
ests remains underexplored in legal scholarship.
1 6
While the historical lack of consumer participation in crafting copy-
right legislation is lamentable, the continued lack of such participation is
especially alarming, as digital technologies and the Internet open up
many new political, social, economic, educational, and career opportuni-
ties. It is therefore understandable why academics, consumer advocates,
and civil libertarians have widely criticized the recent expansion of intel-
lectual property laws, including the introduction of anticircumvention
14. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144-45 (2001). For a classic treatment of public
choice problems in copyright lawmaking, see Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legis-
lative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (lamenting how the recent
expansion of intellectual property laws have stifled creativity and innovation); LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (articulating the needs for the development of a free culture move-
ment); LITMAN, supra (detailing the expansion of copyright laws in the past two centuries); SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001) (describing how the increasing corporate control over the
use of software, digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copyright
law away from its historical design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy). But see Jane C.
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137,
137 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation] (describing the DMCA as "the fruit of
intensive lobbying by a wide range of interest groups of copyright owners, on the one hand, and,
particularly, users, on the other" (emphasis added)).
15. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 898 (2001).
16. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REv. 397, 401
(2003) (stating that "copyright law currently does not have any persuasive or coherent theory of the
consumer, and that examining consumer interests in more detail may shed some useful light on a
number of existing copyright law debates").
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protection. To them, DRM systems and related laws are just another
alarming feature of the ever-expanding copyright regime.
B. Is the Leakage in the Existing Copyright System Acceptable?
Both camps agree that unauthorized downloading is widespread, se-
rious, and probably detrimental to the economic health of the content
industries.' 7  However, they bicker about the actual volumes of illegal
downloading and the resulting adverse financial impact on the indus-
tries.1 8 They also disagree on whether the leakage in the current copy-
right system is acceptable. From the standpoint of rights holders, the
more airtight the protection is, the more profits they will make, and the
more worthwhile their investments will be. Thus, it is ideal for the con-
tent industries to deploy technological measures to ensure zero leakage
from the production facilities to consumers. 19
From the standpoint of consumers, however, this position is not
only unsupportable, but socially detrimental. As Mark Lemley observed:
[T]he effort to permit inventors [and creators] to capture the full so-
cial value of their invention-and the rhetoric of free riding in intel-
lectual property more generally-are fundamentally misguided. In
no other area of the economy do we permit the full internalization of
social benefits. Competitive markets work not because producers
capture the full social value of their output-they do not, except at
the margin-but because they permit producers to make enough
money to cover their costs, including a reasonable return on fixed-
cost investment. Even real property doesn't give property owners the
right to control social value. Various uses of property create uncom-
pensated positive externalities, and we don't see that as a problem or
a reason people won't efficiently invest in their property.
20
17. For example, although Raymond Ku disagrees with the recording industry's position that
file sharing is theft and considers such activities instead as part of a socially beneficial creative
destruction process, he has made it clear that he "doles] not mean to suggest that consumer copying
is not a threat to the recording industry or other content distributors." Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Con-
sumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539,
564, 566 (2003). In fact, he believes that file sharing "is a serious threat, one that strikes at the very
foundation of a business model based upon distributing content to the public." Id. at 566. His dis-
agreement with the industry mainly comes from his belief that "copyright does not protect against
this type of threat" and that "[c]opyright protects the distribution of creative works in general, not a
particular industry or business model." Id.
18. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 658 n.15 (providing
sources disagreeing over the adverse economic impact of file sharing on the recording industry).
19. As Eben Moglen observed, "[tihe content industries want to make a leakproof pipe that
leads from their production facility directly to the eyeball and eardrum of the consumer." Tina
Gasperson, SSSCA Gets a Hearing Oct. 25-Can It Be Stopped?, NEwsFORGE, Oct. 19, 2001,
http://www.newsforge.com/article.pl?sid=0 1/10/19/1546246.
20. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1032 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]. But see John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isola-
tionism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077 (2005) (responding to Professor Lem-
ley). See also Mark A. Lemley, REPLY. What's Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1097 (2005) (replying to Professor Duffy).
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Thus, there are many good policy reasons for harnessing the copyright
system to promote spillovers that are beneficial to innovation and crea-
tivity.2 ' As Professor Lemley pointed out, "[t]he goal of eliminating free
riding ... is ill-suited to the unique characteristics of intellectual prop-
erty ... [, and e]fforts to permit intellectual property owners to fully in-
ternalize the benefits of their creativity will inevitably get the balance
wrong.1
22
Moreover, the First Amendment seems to require some form of ac-
commodation of individual interests in copyright law. Although the Su-
preme Court in Eldred v. Ashcrofl 3 stated that the First Amendment
"bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches," as compared to making or declining to make one's own
speech, the Court recognized that copyright law incorporates "built-in
24free speech safeguards" to address First Amendment concerns, such as
the idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privilege, and the many statu-
tory exceptions cited in the decision. Because of these safeguards, the
Court declined to impose on copyright term extension the "uncommonly
strict scrutiny" applied in First Amendment cases.2 5  As the Court ex-
plained, strict scrutiny is unnecessary as long as "Congress has not al-
tered the traditional contours of copyright protection.,
26
Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility for strict First
Amendment scrutiny when the DMCA or sophisticated DRM systems
have altered those traditional contours. Because the DMCA threatens to
take away the "built-in free speech safeguards," some cyberlaw and First
Amendment scholars, like Jack Balkin, Daniel Farber, and Lawrence
Lessig, suggested that the DMCA may be open to challenge on First
Amendment grounds. 7 Others, by contrast, have questioned whether
21. See Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1052 (contending that "part of the point of
intellectual property law is to promote uncompensated positive externalities, by ensuring that ideas
and works that might otherwise be kept secret are widely disseminated"); see also Brett M. Frisch-
mann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 4 REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2006),
http://ssm.com/abstractid=855244; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark Lemiey, Spillovers, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssm.com/abstractid=898881.
22. Lemiey, Free Riding, supra note 20, at 1032; see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 130 (1999) [hereinafter LESSIG, CODE] (explaining why "perfect
control is not the control that law has given owners of intellectual property").
23. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
24. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 227.
25. See id. at 218-19 ("We reject petitioners' plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scru-
tiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.");
see also id. at 219-20 (discussing the various exceptions in the copyright statute).
26. Id. at 221.
27. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 4, at 1349 (contending that Eldred has "suggest[ed] that more
transformative uses might come out differently under the First Amendment ... [and that] further
First Amendment scrutiny is in order when Congress has altered those contours"); Lawrence Lessig,
Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 41 (stating that "[t]he Court stated that laws that do
not change the 'traditional contours' of copyright protection are not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny, leaving the implication that laws that change those 'traditional contours' do get First
Amendment scrutiny"); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2003_01_12_balkin archive.html#87596430 (Jan. 17, 2003, 11:45 EST) ("Is the Digital Millennium
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there has ever been any "traditional contours of copyright protection,,
28
suggesting that these contours may have to be defined, constructed, or
even "invented., 29  Notwithstanding this continuous debate, it seems
correct to assume that the copyright system needs to accommodate some
form of First Amendment interests. After all, the Court rejected the posi-
tion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit that copyrights are "categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment. 30
In addition to First Amendment interests, commentators have sug-
gested that the "breathing space ' 31 in the copyright system extends to
cover other individual interests and socially-beneficial activities. For
example, Julie Cohen criticized the DMCA for taking away the "breath-
ing space for thought, exploration, and personal growth" usually pro-
tected by the right to privacy.32 Joseph Liu faulted the DMCA for its
"potential of effectively blocking out some of the breathing space that
conventional copyright law made available for more active modes of
consumption. 3 3 Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer discussed
"[t]he challenge . . . to design legal rules that protect information-rich
products against market-destructive cloning while providing enough
breathing room for reverse engineering to enable new entrants to com-
pete and innovate in a competitively healthy way."
34
Some commentators have also underscored the importance of a
regulatory safety valve in our legal system. As Polk Wagner pointed out
recently, "[e]ven under legal schemes that demand little or no interven-
tion on the part of third-party regulatory institutions, such as property-
backed contracts, there nonetheless exist a number of safety valves that
ensure that private arrangements conform to acknowledged boundaries of
Copyright Act Unconstitutional Under Eldred v. Ashcroft?") (suggesting that "the DMCA is consti-
tutionally suspect" under the Eldred logic, because the statute has "altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection").
28. See Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 929-30
(2004) (explaining that it remains unclear whether the Court would find that the DMCA had altered
"the traditional contours of copyright protection").
29. See Farber, supra note 4, at 1322 (observing that the baseline used to determine the ideal
governing regime for the digital domain remains to be "constructed" and cannot be derived from
simple observation); cf THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric J. Hobsbawn & Terence Ranger eds.,
1983) (showing that many of what we consider ancient traditions were actually invented compara-
tively recently).
30. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (stating that "the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared
copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment."' (quoting Eldred v.
Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 414-
26 (1999) (describing how the DMCA raises First Amendment concerns); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 74-81 (2001) (contend-
ing that the DMCA is vulnerable to First Amendment challenge).
31. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
32. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 578 (2003).
33. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, supra note 16, at 429.
34. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineer-
ing, Ill YALE L.J. 1575, 1580 (2002).
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social practice." 35 Thus, one can conclude that some leakage is benefi-
cial and can be further justified as the needed "safety valve" in the copy-
right system.36 After all, the Framers of the Constitution intended copy-
right to be the "engine of free expression, 3 7 and jurists and commenta-
tors have underscored the "safety valve" function of the First Amend-
ment.38
C. Are the Existing Technological Measures Sufficiently Effective?
Both camps agree that the arms race between copyright holders and
technology developers on the one hand and hackers--or, more accu-
rately, crackers-on the other hand is wasteful. 39 In fact, society will be
35. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, 42 HOus. L. REv. 1107,1118 (2005). Among
the safety valves he cited are the doctrine of unconscionability in contract law, unfair competition
law, principles of nondiscrimination, and restraint encouraged by public enforcement of contract
law. Id.
36. Cf Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(stating that "[iut has been viewed by courts as a safety valve that accommodates the exclusive rights
conferred by copyright with the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment"). There
is no guarantee, however, in what form this safety valve should take. As stated in a study by the
Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, "the current law already includes a 'safety valve'-
in addition to several exemptions set out in the law, the Copyright Office can create new exemptions
through its rulemaking proceeding." June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A
Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 390
(2004).
37. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
38. As Justice Louis Brandeis recognized in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence ... knew that order cannot be secured merely through
fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces
stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely sup-
posed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones.
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927); see also Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Re-
form: Press, Law, and Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 742 (1993)
(stating that the press in the United States "has acted as a 'safety valve' for the release and 'domesti-
cation' of popular discontent and frustration" (footnote omitted)); Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting
and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141 n. 177 (1993) (stating that "[a]dvocates of a 'safety valve'
theory of the First Amendment can cite Brandeis' [concurrence in Whitney v. California]").
39. I described this endless arms race earlier:
Although copy protection technologies allow copyright holders to lock up creative works,
these technologies lose their protective function when they are decrypted. Even worse,
once the decryption key is disclosed, the copyrighted work will become available not
only to those "techies" who successfully broke the code but also to unsophisticated users
around the world.... To prevent the public from breaking the copy protection technol-
ogy, copyright holders must constantly upgrade their technology. Such upgrading, unfor-
tunately, will further attract the attention of hackers, who are eager to tinker with the lat-
est technology. Eventually, the repeated encryption and decryption will create a vicious
cycle in which the entertainment industry and the hacker community engage in an endless
copy protection arms race.
Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 722-24 (footnotes omitted); see also
Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153 (stating that an "arms race wastes creative
resources that might be better directed toward creating original works of authorship, rather than
devices that promote piracy"); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 217, 251 (discussing the "wasteful 'arms race' of technological-protection schemes, with
each side increasing its spending to outperform the other's technology"); Raymond Shih Ray Ku,
The Creative Destruction of Copyright. Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 319-20 (2002) (discussing an expensive and unending technological arms race).
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better off if the content industries devote their scarce resources to nurtur-
ing artists and creators and improving products, rather than upgrading the
technology that is used to restrict consumers' access to copyrighted
works.40
Both camps also understand that there are no perfect, hacker-proof
DRM systems.41 As Edward Felten explained, even the best encryption
technology merely serves as "a speed bump that will frustrate people
who want to copy illegally., 42 The goal of DRM systems is not to ensure
that the content will be unavailable to highly sophisticated hackers.
Rather, it is to "help ... keep honest people honest"43-or, as Fred von
Lohmann put it, to help "keep[] technically unsophisticated people hon-
est." 44 By providing "virtual fences," DRM systems also can help signal
40. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 723.
41. See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age. Is the Marketplace
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?. Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 89-92 (2002) (testimony of Edward W. Felten, Associate Professor of Computer Sci-
ence, Princeton University) (noting that "strong encryption" techniques that a moderately skilled
person cannot break do not exist in the real world), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/useftp.cgi?lpaddress= 162.140.64.21 &filename=85758.pdf&directory=/diskc/wais/data/I107sena
te hearings; PETER BIDDLE ET AL., THE DARKNET AND THE FUTURE OF CONTENT DISTRIBUTION §
5.1 (2002), http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (noting that digital rights management
systems "are doomed to failure"); Stuart Haber, If Piracy Is the Problem, Is DRM the Answer?, in
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 224 (arguing that "given the current and foresee-
able state of technology the content protection features of DRM are not effective at combating pi-
racy"); Pamela Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 41, 43 (stating
that "no DRM technology is hacker-proof'); see also Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act Against the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological
Protection Measures, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 635, 638 (2004) ("Proponents of the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions were not naive about the technological infallibility of TPMs. They admit-
ted that no technology would be foolproof against every hacker bent on compromising it.").
42. A "Speed Bump" vs. Music Copying, Bus. WK., Jan. 9, 2002 (interview with Professor
Edward Felten of Princeton University), available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/jan2002/nf2002019_7170.htm. Although no encryption technology can protect perfectly,
such technology does not need to be perfectly robust to have a positive effect.
43. As a National Research Council study observed:
Most people are not technically knowledgeable enough to defeat even moderately sophis-
ticated systems and, in any case, are law-abiding citizens rather than determined adver-
saries. TPSs [technical protection services] with what might be called "curb-high deter-
rence"-systems that can be circumvented by a knowledgeable person-are sufficient in
many instances. They can deter the average user from engaging in illegal behavior and
may deter those who may be ignorant about some aspects of the law by causing them to
think carefully about the appropriateness of their copying. Simply put, TPSs can help to
keep honest people honest.
COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
218 (2000) [hereinafter DIGITAL DILEMMA].
44. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 639; see also David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 740 (2000) [hereinafter Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use] (stating that "[i]f the courts apply section 1201 as written, the only users whose inter-
ests are truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract
whatever technological measures are placed in their path" (footnote omitted)). Pamela Samuelson,
however, questioned "whether Congress intended for the technologically savvy who could 'do it
themselves' to be the only ones who could engage in privileged acts of circumvention." Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regula-
tions Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 551 (1999) [hereinafter Samuelson, Intellec-
tual Property and the Digital Economy]. But see Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, Il1 F. Supp.
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to the outside world the traditionally elusive boundaries of intellectual
property,45 even though these systems sometimes "'fence in' material
that is either not copyrighted or which is already in the public domain.
' 46
Nevertheless, the two camps disagree on whether the encryption
technology currently deployed by the content industries is sufficiently
effective to protect copyrighted works.47 A case in point is the weak
copy-protection technology manufactured by SunnComm for BMG's
CDs.48  In October 2003, SunnComm threatened to sue a computer sci-
ence graduate student under the DMCA after he posted a paper on his
website explaining how to disarm SunnComm's technology by pushing
the shift key when loading a CD into a computer. 49  While there is no
doubt that the student's disclosure of this embarrassing flaw has reduced
the company's market value in the short term, it is unclear how such a
shift-key-disabled technology could be considered effective.5 °
It is important to remember that the anticircumvention provision of
the DMCA, and the WIPO Internet Treaties on which it was based, were
created to promote self-help. 5' To some extent, the provision can be seen
2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declaring that "[the fact that Congress elected to leave technologi-
cally unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the
technical means of doing so is a matter for Congress unless Congress' decision contravenes the
Constitution").
45. See, e.g., Ian R. Kerr et al., Technical Protection Measures. Tilting at Copyright's Wind-
mill, 34 OTTAWA L. REv. 7, 13 (2002) (stating that "TPMs can operate as safeguards or 'virtual
fences' around digitized content, whether or not the content enjoys copyright protection"); Ejan
Mackaay, Intellectual Property and the Internet: The Share of Sharing, in THE COMMODIFICATION
OF INFORMATION 133, 136-38 (Neil Weinstock Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds., 2002) (discussing
the "fencing" aspect of property). But cf Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for
Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 53 (2001) (discussing the uneasiness of
using the "fence" metaphor).
46. Thomas Dreier & Georg Nolte, The German Copyright-Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, in
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 479, 496.
47. Effectiveness is actually one of the requirements of the DMCA. See 17 U.S.C. §
1201 (a)(3)(B) (2004) (stating that "a technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if
the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a
process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work"); id. §
1201(b)(2)(B) (stating that "a technological measure 'effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or
otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title").
48. BMG seems to have its unfortunate share of bad publicity about its deployment of TPMs.
The most recent embarrassment concerns the unauthorized installation of a "rootkit" onto users'
computers. For a discussion of this controversy in this symposium issue, see Megan M. LaBelle,
The "Rootkit Debacle": The Latest Chapter in the Story of the Recording Industry and the War on
Music Piracy, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 79 (2006).
49. John Borland, Student Faces Suit Over Key to CD Locks, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 9, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1025-5089168.html.
50. SunnComm smartly dropped the lawsuit. See Declan McCullagh, SunnComm Won 't Sue
Grad Student, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 10, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5089448.html.
51. See, e.g., DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 312 (stating that it is "a perfectly under-
standable goal" when the DMCA is "[i]nterpreted as an incentive for copyright owners to protect
their own property, rather than to rely solely on the police and the courts"); ROBERT S. SCHWARTZ &
MIKE GODWIN, BEYOND GROKSTER: A CRITIQUE OF THE MODELS PROPOSED BY COPYRIGHT AND
LAW-AND-ECONOMICS AUTHORITIES (2005), http://www.publicknowledge.org/news/analysis/
critique-menellet-rss-mg (stating that "Sections 1201(a) and (b) are aimed at strengthening a regime
of licensed technological measures and self-help, as an alternative to copyright litigation");
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as a two-step legislative compromise. The first step commences when
copyright holders introduce technological measures that effectively pro-
tect copyrighted works. If the rights holders complete the first step by
deploying effective measures, the law will then kick in to offer additional
protection, based partly on the premise that some legal protection is
needed to compensate for the lack of perfect, hacker-proof encryption
technology. However, if the copyright holder fails to complete the first
step, there is no need to reach the second step. Thus, the anticircumven-
tion right-if there is one-is not absolute, but conditional, and circum-
vention of technological measures per se is not a violation of the DMCA.
D. Who Should Sacrifice in Early DRM Systems?
Both camps agree that DRM systems are important and can be very
useful, especially during a transitional period when the content industries
are seeking solutions to the extensive unauthorized copying problem
created by the Internet and new media technologies.52 Thus, the question
for the debate is not whether the use of these systems and related laws is
good or bad, but what systems should be deployed, under what circum-
stances they should be deployed, and whether they embody the important
values of our society.53
Although self-help measures and supporting laws are often criti-
cized, DRM systems actually have many benefits.54 Indeed, as Lionel
Sobel observed, these systems "appear[] to be at the foundation of what-
ever business models will actually succeed in the digital age."' 55 If effec-
tively deployed, they can help "facilitate[] the acquisition of rights, re-
duce transaction costs and allow a better price differentiation by permit-
Mackaay, supra note 45, at 137 ("If new technology results in old fences becoming more permeable,
this problem falls to the owner. It is not the mission of state law enforcement to shore up outdated
fences.").
52. For a discussion of this transition, see generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43.
53. See Symposium, Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on the Law & Tech-
nology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 697, 741 (2003) [hereinafter DRM
Symposium Transcript] ("The question is not: DRM, yes or no? It can be a helpful tool. It's under
what context it's being developed and how it's being used.") (remarks of Commissioner Mozelle
Thompson of the Federal Trade Commission).
54. For discussions of the needs and benefits of DRM systems, see generally Kenneth W.
Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 405 (1999); Dean S. Marks & Bruce
H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial
Licences, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 198 (2000); Barry B. Sookman, "TPMs ": A Perfect Storm for
Consumers: Replies to Professor Geist, 4 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 23 (2005), available at
http://cjlt.dal.ca/vol4 nol/index.html.
55. Lionel S. Sobel, DRMs as an Enabler of Business Models: ISPs as Digital Retailers, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 669 (2003). As elaborated by one commentator:
DRMs enable a wide variety of business models. They are seen as being crucial for the
development of new business models, in which pricing schemes, subscription models,
credit sales and billing schemes could be incorporated. DRMs permit different price-
points for services, such as "A la carte" downloads, subscriptions, or rental and preview.
Business models might also include network downloads, streaming, rights lockers,
broadcasts and super distribution using P2P technologies.
Sookman, supra note 54, at 31.
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ting the rights holder to tailor their products and the prices to the individ-
ual needs of the users. 56 They also foster competition and allow rights
holders to "better exploit the markets for their products" and ultimately
provide greater choices for consumers.57 In addition, as Kenneth Dam
pointed out, such systems "can ... serve purposes akin to moral rights,
first by assuring attribution to the author, artist, or composer, and second
by ensuring the integrity of documents, images, and music.,' 58  If the
copyrighted works are reasonably priced, and the use of DRM systems is
not too burdensome, those systems "will [even] facilitate the change in
public mores that will be required to make paying for information seem
to be the thing to do rather than an encroachment on freedom.,
59
By contrast, if they are improperly deployed, they will intrude upon
the users' individual privacy while stripping away important rights con-
sumers have traditionally enjoyed in the physical space, including the
idea-expression dichotomy, the fair use privilege, the first sale doctrine,
and many other lawful personal uses. The next Part will discuss in
greater detail how the misuse of DRMs and anticircumvention laws can
be harmful at both the domestic and intemational levels.6 °
To boost the use of DRM systems and related laws, proponents
have justified their proposals by sfating that consumers sometimes have
to sacrifice, at least in the early stages of development of DRM systems.
As they argue, because digital technologies allow individuals to repro-
duce unlimited copies of copyrighted works in near-perfect quality, ef-
fective protection is essential for the continued development of copy-
righted products.61 Without such protection, new, innovative products
would not appear in the market in the first place. Thus, the proponents
claimed, Congress has recalibrated the balance in the copyright system to
respond to the challenge created by the digital revolution. As Eric Smith
of the International Intellectual Property Alliance declared, "Congress
made a judgment that the danger from unauthorized copying and further
56. Dreier & Nolte, supra note 46, at 501.
57. Id.; Sookman, supra note 54, at 31 ("In contrast to traditional distribution, consumers
could gain wider access to content wherever and whenever they choose. Given their ability to un-
bundle copyright into discrete and custom-made products, DRMs promise a much greater range of
consumer choice and perhaps even a reduction in prices.").
58. Dam, supra note 54, at 405. As Ian Kerr and others explained:
Under a moral rights view, they would say, the creators of original works ought to have
some ability to control the use of those works-not merely because their financial liveli-
hoods depend on it but, also because of the ease with which a digital work can be unbun-
dled. The unbundling of a digital work threatens the integrity of the work and poses seri-
ous challenges for those creators who wish to ensure that elements of their work are
given proper attribution. As such, the personality and reputational rights of authors,
which are so deeply and inextricably tied to the products of their creation, are in jeop-
ardy.
Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 39.
59. Dam, supra note 54, at 409.
60. See discussion Part II.
61. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 48 n.20 (collecting congressional testimonies on this
point).
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distribution of digitally transmitted material was so high, that there could
be some incursions on fair use."6 2 Similarly, the court noted the neces-
sary sacrifice in United States v. Elcom Ltd .63:
[W]hile it is not unlawful to circumvent for the purpose of engaging
in fair use, it is unlawful to traffic in tools that allow fair use circum-
vention. That is part of the sacrifice Congress was willing to make in
order to protect against unlawful piracy and promote the develop-
ment of electronic commerce and the availability of copyrighted ma-
terial on the Intemet.
64
Notably, both the proponents and courts have not denied that the DMCA
has burdened free speech and other legitimate uses. Rather, they believe
that the industries successfully convinced Congress that these burdens
were acceptable because they were necessary to slow piracy and to pro-
mote the development of electronic commerce.
Critics, however, disagree, for good reasons. While the protection
of private property is important, it is not the only right enshrined in the
United States Constitution. There are many other important rights, such
as freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of thought, and the
right to privacy. The proponents' argument that property is so important
that we have to give up our other important rights simply does not with-
stand constitutional scrutiny. 65  Indeed, the American people have de-
cided not to set up such a scheme in the physical space, and the propo-
nents have yet to rebut this position or persuasively explain why we need
to change our tradition in the digital environment. As Yochai Benkler
pointed out in the context of self-help measures:
The convenience of using self-help measures rather than the more
ponderous legal process is not an insignificant value. But it is one
that courts and legislators have often decided must yield in the face
of important countervailing interests. Landlords can no longer use
self-help against tenants in most jurisdictions, but instead must resort
62. Symposium, Implications of Enforcing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Case
Study, Focusing on United States v. Sklyarov, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 805,
841 (2002) [hereinafter Sklyarov Symposium Transcript] (remarks of Eric Smith of the International
Intellectual Property Alliance); accord Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 142 (stat-
ing that "Congress has independently determined that this scope of protection is necessary to afford
meaningful protection to copyrighted works in the digital environment").
63. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
64. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1125; see also Besek, supra note 36, at 391 ("Section 1201
involves genuine tradeoffs: Congress, recognizing that technological controls might diminish the
convenience of making privileged uses, nonetheless made a judgment that technological protection
would foster innovation in new content delivery mechanisms and provide consumers with a range of
new options for experiencing copyrighted works").
65. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?, 2002
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375 (questioning whether copyright protection should trump the protec-
tion of the right to privacy); Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its
Legal Milieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 23, 23 (2006) (urging that "policy arguments about property in
the digital environment take explicit cognizance of other policy considerations that tend to bound
propertization: contractual ordering, competition, and freedom of expression").
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to summary process. Life, limb, and the public peace were consid-
ered by courts too important to sacrifice in the name of effective self-
help. The claimed inefficiency of courts at enforcing copyrights
hardly seems an adequate reason to prevent individuals from reading,
criticizing, or mocking the words of others in ways that the law of
copyright privileges them to do. 6
6
When the issue is projected into the international sphere, the impor-
tance of protection of private property vis-A-vis other rights becomes
even more contestable. The word "private," for example, was deliber-
ately omitted in the right to property provision of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, which states that "[e]veryone has the right to own
property alone as well as in association with others. '67  The right to
property was also not explicitly recognized in both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights68 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 69 the two legally-binding hu-
man rights instruments drafted after the adoption of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights. Unlike anticircumvention laws, these interna-
tional covenants have recognized many potential countervailing interests,
such as the right to freedom of thought, the right to freedom of expres-
sion, the right to education, the right to take part in cultural life, and the
right to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.7 °
Moreover, commentators have suggested that there does not have to
be "an all-or-nothing choice between the total control of DRM and ram-
pant copyright infringement.",7 1  While sacrifices may sometimes be
needed, especially in the early stages of development of DRM systems,
consumers may not need to sacrifice as much as the DMCA requires.
66. Benkler, supra note 30, at 426 (footnote omitted).
67. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 17(1), G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.
(1948) [hereinafter UDHR] (emphasis added); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property
Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927335 (discussing the omission of the word "private" in article 17 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 182-83 (2001) (dis-
cussing the different conceptions of the right to property among the various delegates to the Human
Rights Commission).
68. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
69. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
70. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 19(1) (recognizing the right to freedom of thought);
id. art. 19(2) (recognizing the right to freedom of expression); ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 13 (rec-
ognizing the right to education); id. art. 15(l)(a) (recognizing the right to take part in cultural life);
id. art. 15(l)(b) (recognizing the fight to the benefits of scientific progress and its applications).
71. Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About the DMCA's Anti-
Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 697; see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the
Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA 's Anti-Device Provisions, 19
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 111, 113 (2005) [hereinafter Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle] (stating
that "[c]ourts typically take an all-or-nothing approach to circumvention technologies, usually result-
ing in a complete ban on marketing them"); Lunney, supra note 15, at 820 (observing that "decryp-
tion presents something close to an all-or-nothing choice").
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For example, Dan Burk and Julie Cohen proposed a mixed fair use infra-
structure that includes automatic fair use defaults and a key escrow sys-
tem that provides would-be fair users with the needed encryption keys to
obtain access to protected works.72 Drawing on British law, Jacqueline
Lipton offered an administrative complaint mechanism for individuals
who sought to obtain legitimate uses of copyrighted works.7 3 As she
explained, "[a]dministrative approaches tend to be more flexible and less
formal in their procedures than judicial processes and are generally less
costly than judicial hearings. 74 Alfred Yen suggested that "[a] circum-
vention technology control law modeled after federal gun control law
will deter the irresponsible misuse of circumvention technology while
preserving access to such technology for lawful purposes. 75 Professor
Yen's proposal is quite similar to the national verification system intro-
duced in Australia.76
E. How Should Society Respond to the Digital Challenge?
As discussed above, both camps understand the "digital challenge"
confronting the content industries. They also appreciate the need for
transition and the sometimes imperfection of transitional policies. How-
ever, they disagree on whether the law should err on the side of consum-
ers or that of rights holders, especially when supporting empirical evi-
dence is lacking one way or the other.
It is important to remember that creating protection for copyright
holders is a means to an end, not an end itself.77 As the Supreme Court
72. See Burk & Cohen, supra note 45.
73. See Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71. Her proposal draws, but
improves on, the administrative complaint mechanism provided under the British Copyright, De-
signs and Patents Act of 1988. Section 296ZE of the statute provides:
Where the application of any effective technological measure to a copyright work other
than a computer program prevents a person from carrying out a permitted act in relation
to that work then that person or a person being a representative of a class of persons pre-
vented from carrying out a permitted act may issue a notice of complaint to the Secretary
of State.
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZE(2) (U.K.) (amended 2003).
74. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 155.
75. Yen, supra note 71, at 697.
76. As Ian Kerr and others described:
In order to make sure that a circumventing device or service is really used for a permitted
purpose, a person wishing to make such a use must provide the supplier of the device or
service with a signed declaration containing information, such as the person's name and
address, the basis of the exemption claimed, the name and address of the supplier, a
statement that the device or service is to be used for a permitted purpose and identifica-
tion of that purpose by reference to a specific section of the Copyright Act.
Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-59.
77. See, e.g., COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2002) [hereinafter IPR COMMISSION REPORT] ("Regardless of the term used
for them, we prefer to regard IPRs as instruments of public policy which confer economic privileges
on individuals or institutions solely for the purposes of contributing to the greater public good. The
privilege is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself."), available at
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf; Dan T. Coenen & Paul J.
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reminded us in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,78 and again in
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,7 9 "[t]he
ultimate aim [of copyright] is ... to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. '80 Earlier in Mazer v. Stein,8' the Court also stated
that "[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful
Arts.'
8 2
The two camps also disagree on what society should do in the
meantime while the legislature is searching for a better solution.83
Should consumers wait for the content industries to come up with better
protection mechanisms and a viable business plan? Or should the indus-
tries wait for consumers to change their attitudes toward the protection of
artists and creators or for society to develop legal solutions that can
equally protect both consumers and copyright holders?
In congressional testimonies, the content industries stated that they
were unlikely to release works until the market was well protected.84
However, experience on the Internet and in China (as well as in other
major markets in the less developed world) has demonstrated otherwise.
There is no doubt that the industries are very reluctant to release creative
works if no protection whatsoever exists. However, they might be more
willing to do so if some protection exists. In fact, because rights holders
are unlikely to find a marketplace that has zero leakage, economics sug-
gest that they will release their products if the profits they obtain will
exceed their piracy-related losses. Some rights holders may even write
off these early losses as expenses for the experimentation of new busi-
ness plans or for promotion or market development purposes. As Micro-
soft's founder Bill Gates famously declared:
Although about three million computers get sold every year in China,
people don't pay for the software. Someday they will, though. And
Heald, Means/Ends Analysis in Copyright Law: Eldred v. Ashcroft in One Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
99 (2002) (discussing the means-end fit of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
78. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
79. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
80. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 (quoting Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156).
81. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
82. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
83. Cf Peter K. Yu, Innovation Gains Edge in Music, Movie Battle, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 29,
2004, at 15A (stating that "[t]he difficult question in the Grokster case is not whether the court
should exercise caution while waiting for time and market forces to achieve some balance, but whom
the court should ask to wait").
84. Even Jane Ginsburg, a noted advocate of strong authors' rights, conceded that "[t]he
assumption that copyright owners will only make their works available in copy-protected form may
well be overstated." Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153. Nevertheless, she
believes the issue should be left for the U.S. Copyright Office to review during its triennial rulemak-
ing proceeding. Id.
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as long as they're going to steal it, we want them to steal ours.
They'll get sort of addicted, and then we'll somehow figure out how
to collect sometime in the next decade.
85
It remains to be seen whether Mr. Gates has figured out how to collect
these lost software license fees, especially in light of the growing devel-
opment of open source software in China.86
F. Summary
In sum, both camps share sufficient common ground to start a dia-
logue, but their considerable disagreements prevent them from reaching
mutually acceptable conclusions. Because many of their differences
have yet to be proved or disproved by empirical data, the positions they
eventually will take will depend on their perceptions of the market, the
state of technology, and the expectation of consumers, all of which are
susceptible to rapid changes in the digital world. As Daniel Farber
pointed out insightfully, their differing positions may also raise broader
and deeper issues about "how the economy works, how power is distrib-
uted in society, and how individuals can best flourish under contempo-
rary conditions. 87 With the continuous change in the market, technol-
ogy, and social norms, it will be interesting to see whether the two camps
can eventually agree on what the legal regime should be and how to
build the next generation of DRM systems.
Although the divide between these two camps is unlikely to narrow
in the near future, the actual DRM debate is actually more complicated.
As I mentioned in the beginning, the stakeholders in this debate are not
divided nicely into the pro-anticircumvention camp and the anti-
anticircumvention camp. Instead, they accrue different benefits from the
use of DRM systems and have incurred different costs. As a result, their
positions often change according to the market, technologies, and con-
sumer behavior. As a National Research Council study reminds us:
The debate over intellectual property includes almost everyone, from
authors and publishers, to consumers (e.g., the reading, listening, and
viewing public), to libraries and educational institutions, to govern-
mental and standards bodies. Each of the stakeholders has a variety
of concerns ... that are at times aligned with those of other stake-
holders, and at other times opposed. An individual stakeholder may
also play multiple roles with various concerns. At different times, a
single individual may be an author, reader, consumer, teacher, or
shareholder in publishing or entertainment companies; a member of
an editorial board; or an officer of a scholarly society that relies on
85. Brent Schlender et al., The Bill & Warren Show, FORTUNE, July 20, 1998, at 48.
86. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode 11): Protecting Intellectual Property
in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 982 (2006) (using Microsoft products to illustrate how
piracy losses can be treated as promotional expenses needed to capture an emerging market).
87. Farber, supra note 4, at 1358.
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publishing for revenue. The dominant concern will depend on the
part played at the moment.
88
Thus, the DRM debate is far more complex and dynamic than what the
bipolar debate has suggested. This Part merely emphasizes the debate's
bipolar nature to underscore the importance of finding common ground
between the many stakeholders in the DRM debate.
II. THE ANTICIRCUMVENTION REGIME
Although DRM systems can be traced back to the early days of the
software industry, the international standards for these systems were not
created until the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, which updated
international intellectual property norms to reflect changes in the digital
environment. 89 Entering into effect in 2002, both the WIPO Copyright
Treaty ("WCT") and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
("WPPT") require member states to "provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective tech-
nological measures" that are needed to protect creative works. 90 Al-
though the treaties leave discretion to the member states over how to
discharge their obligations, several countries have chosen to create an
anticircumvention regime. In the United States, for example, Congress
enacted the oft-criticized DMCA.91  Other countries, like Australia,
China, Japan, and various members of the European Union, have since
followed suit to enact anticircumvention laws, or are in the process of
doing so.
92
Although the WIPO Internet Treaties require only adequate protec-
tion and effective remedies, the DMCA went beyond this requirement to
prohibit the circumvention of any technological measure that effectively
controls access to, or use of, a copyrighted work.93 The statute also pro-
hibits the manufacture, importation, or distribution of any technology or
device that is primarily designed, produced, or knowingly marketed for
the purpose of circumventing such a measure or that does not have any
commercially significant purpose other than to circumvent the measure.
94
88. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 51; see also Jeremy F. deBeer, Locks & Levies, 84
DENV. U. L. REV. 143, 165-75 (2006) (discussing the impact of locks and levies from the perspec-
tives of three main groups of stakeholders--creators, technology firms, and consumers).
89. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. agenda at the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference,
see generally Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997)
[hereinafter Samuelson, US. Digital Agenda].
90. See WCT, supra note 7, art. 11; WPPT, supra note 7, art. 18.
91. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2004).
92. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-64 (discussing anticircumvention regimes in
Australia, Japan, and the European Union); Regulations on the Protection of the Right of Communi-
cation Through Information Network, (promulgated by the State Council, May 10, 2006, effective
July 1, 2006) (P.R.C.), available in Chinese at http://www.ncac.gov.cn/servlet/servlet.info.
NatLawServlet?action=list&id=529.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
94. See id. §§ 1201(a)(2), 1201(b).
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To protect the public interest, the DMCA expressly states that Con-
gress did not intend to alter existing "rights, remedies, limitations, or
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use," the scope of vi-
carious or contributory liability for copyright infringement, or the free
speech and free press guarantees under the First Amendment as they
relate to consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing prod-
ucts.95  In addition, the statute enumerates seven narrow, carefully-
drafted exceptions for nonprofit organizations, law enforcement agen-
cies, reverse engineers, encryption researchers, and security testers, as
well as for the protection of minors and of personally identifying infor-
mation. 96 Finally, the statute includes a triennial rulemaking proceeding
to determine whether users would be, or are likely to be, "adversely af-
fected by the prohibition ... to make noninfringing uses.. . of a particu-
lar class of copyrighted works." 97  Conducted by the Librarian of Con-
gress, this proceeding has led to the creation of a small number of new,
but limited exceptions.9 8
95. Id. § 1201(c).
96. See, e.g., id. § 1201(d) (exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational insti-
tutions); id. § 1201(e) (exemption for law enforcement, intelligence, and other government activi-
ties); id. § 1201(f) (exemption for reverse engineering); id. § 1201(g) (exemption for encryption
research); id. § 1201 (h) (exceptions regarding minors); id. § 1201 (i) (protection of personally identi-
fying information); id. § 1201(j) (exemption for security testing). For a detailed discussion of these
exemptions, see generally Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 148-52.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C); see also id. § 1201(a)(I)(B)-(D) (outlining the triennial rule-
making proceeding). When the statute was first enacted, it also included a two-year moratorium on
enforcement of the anticircumvention provision due to "the strong concerns expressed by librarians
and educators about the potential negative impacts that broad anti-circumvention provisions might
have on fair uses of copyrighted works and on access to information and to public domain works."
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 559.
98. See, e.g., Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumven-
tion of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556 (2000);
Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (2003). These exceptions
are limited because the Librarian of Congress narrowly defined the term "a particular class of copy-
righted works" in the rulemaking proceedings. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C). The current available
exemptions, for example, apply to persons who engage in noninfringing uses of the following four
classes of copyrighted works:
(1) Compilations consisting of lists of Intemet locations blocked by commercially mar-
keted filtering software applications that are intended to prevent access to domains, web-
sites or portions of websites, but not including lists of Intemet locations blocked by soft-
ware applications that operate exclusively to protect against damage to a computer or
computer network or lists of Internet locations blocked by software applications that op-
erate exclusively to prevent receipt of e-mail.
(2) Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction or
damage and which are obsolete.
(3) Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have become obso-
lete and which require the original media or hardware as a condition of access. A format
shall be considered obsolete if the machine or system necessary to render perceptible a
work stored in that format is no longer manufactured or is no longer reasonably available
in the commercial marketplace.
(4) Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook editions of the
work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities) contain access
controls that prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that prevent the
enabling of screen readers to render the text into a specialized format.
37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b) (2006).
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Notwithstanding these public interest safeguards, this Article takes
the position that the DMCA was defectively designed and that anticir-
cumvention laws are problematic at both the domestic and international
levels. This Part first discusses the problems with the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA at the domestic level. It then explains why an
international anticircumvention regime modeled after the DMCA would
be even more harmful. If countries are to introduce such a regime, they
need to carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of such protection. They
also need to tailor the contours of protection to their local needs, inter-
ests, and conditions and avoid the wholesale transplant of the DMCA to
their own soil. In addition, in jurisdictions where the WIPO Internet
Treaties are self-executing, 99 courts need to remember that the treaties do
not require anticircumvention protection l°° and that countries can comply
with the treaties without ever introducing such protection.10'
A. The Domestic Regime
As commentators have widely noted, there are four main criticisms
of the anticircumvention provision of the DMCA. First, the DMCA has
made it difficult for users and future creators to exercise legitimate rights
under existing copyright law. 0 2 On its face, the statute seems to be pro-
99. A self-executing treaty is one that can be enforced in courts without prior implementing
legislation. In jurisdictions where the WIPO Internet Treaties are self-executing, courts will directly
apply the treaties as if they are domestic laws.
100. Cf. Michael Geist, Anti-circumvention Legislation and Competition Policy: Defining a
Canadian Way?, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 211,240
(Michael Geist ed., 2005) (stating that, in countries that "have allowed for the WIPO Internet treaties
to take direct effect within their countries. . . , it would be difficult to discern the precise legal rules
since the WCT and WPPT do not contain the specificity typically found in implementing legisla-
tion").
101. See infra discussion Part II.B.I (discussing alternative ways to comply with the WIPO
Internet Treaties).
102. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1138 (2003)
(noting that "[tihe limited exceptions provided under the statute, or under the rulemaking authority
of the Librarian of Congress, lack the breadth and flexibility to fill the equitable role played by fair
use"); Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 54 (claiming that "[clurrently, the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions effectively sanction the use of private code to write the public law of fair
use out of existence"); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of Unintended Consequences: The Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 WASH & LEE L. REv. 487, 494-95 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Lipton, Law of Unintended Consequences] (noting that "several recent bills have been introduced
into Congress to remedy the perceived defects of the DMCA in terms of its impact on the fair use
defense"); Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use, supra note 44, at 739 (stating that "[tihe user safeguards so
proudly heralded as securing balance between owner and user interests, on inspection, largely fail to
achieve their stated goals"). But cf. Zohar Efroni, Towards a Doctrine of "Fair Access" in Copy-
right: The Federal Circuit's Accord, 46 IDEA 99 (2005) (arguing that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit is developing a common law doctrine of "fair access" in Chamber-
lain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc. and Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engi-
neering & Consulting, Inc.); David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History the Sweet and Sour
Spots of the DMCA 's Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 909, 979 (2002) (holding a belief that "a
tight reading of Section 1201 ... leaves no room within the statutory orbit for a general Congres-
sionally-sanctioned fair use defense," but that, "to effectuate justice in a concrete case, judges may
go outside the statutory text by doing what common law jurists have done since time immemorial");
Lipton, Law of Unintended Consequences, supra note 102, at 495 (observing that judges in Lexmark
and Chamberlain have "suggest[ed] a greater role for the fair use defense, even in the DMCA con-
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tective of these rights. Section 1201(c) states explicitly that "[n]othing in
this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copy-
right infringement, including fair use, under this title." 10 3 As described
above, the statute also includes exceptions and a triennial rulemaking
proceeding. In reality, the exceptions under the DMCA are highly con-
strained, and many of the legitimate rights that exist in copyright law are
unavailable under the anticircumvention regime. As Dan Burk observed:
The separation between the anticircumvention right and copyright
becomes apparent when comparing the limitations on each: ...
[C]opyright contains numerous exceptions and user privileges, such
as statutory provisions allowing unauthorized use of copyrighted
works in classroom instruction, in certain religious services, and
creation of "back-up" copies of computer programs, to name a few.
None of these uses is sanctioned by the anticircumvention provisions.
If a work is protected by technical controls, circumventing those con-
trols to act in a manner privileged under the copyright act is still pro-
hibited. Outside of circumvention for the few exceptions described
above, the only statutorily sanctioned method for gaining access to
technically protected works is with the permission of the content104
owner.
In addition, "even though copyright law confers on copyright own-
ers the right to control only public performances and displays of these
works, DRM systems can also be used to control private performances
and displays of digital content."' 0 5 The DMCA also threatens the first
sale doctrine and many different lawful private uses, including those
customary ones that may or may not have been codified as exceptions in
the current copyright statute. 0 6  Indeed, when the statute was being
text"); Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 540 (stating
that, "[i]f section 120 1(c)(1)'s preservation of fair use and other defenses to infringement are to be
given their plain meaning, it would seem that this sort of circumvention should be permissible").
103. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (emphasis added); see also Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy
Puzzle, supra note 71, at 120 (suggesting that, because the treaties did not mention the effect of the
anticircumvention provision on fair use, "the drafters of the treaties may have assumed that the
domestic implementation of the relevant treaty terms would not adversely affect activities that are
permitted by law, such as fair use").
104. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1107. For a discussion of the impact
of the DMCA on the enjoyment and exercise of fair use, see generally Lipton, Solving the Digital
Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 115-16 (describing the various DMCA provisions that sought "to
balance the competing needs of fair use and digital content protection"). See also ANDREW L.
SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW INTERNET Is PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND
CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 18 (1999) (proposing "a rule analogous to fair use that might be
known as 'fair hacking' or 'fair breach'); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-
Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1092 (1998) (arguing that "licensees ... should be accorded
rights of electronic self-help when necessary to preserve the balance that the Copyright Act is in-
tended to establish"); Geist, supra note 100, at 248-49 (proposing to amend the anticircumvention
bill "to include a positive user right to circumvent a technological measure for lawful purposes").
105. Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42.
106. For discussions of these lawful personal uses, see generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Per-
sonal Use (Michigan Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 06-004, 2006),
http://ssm.com/abstract-id=926575; Lunney, supra note 15.
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drafted, then-Senator John Ashcroft expressed concern that the anticir-
cumvention provision "would have established a flat prohibition on the
circumvention of technological protection measures to gain access to
works for any purpose, and thus raised the specter of moving our Nation
towards a 'pay-per-use' society."'107 Although this pay-per-use society
has yet to materialize, critics remain justifiably concerned.
In the statute's defense, one has to differentiate between access-
control and use-control technologies, which receive different treatment
under the DMCA.108  As Alan Adler of the Association of American
Publishers testified before Congress, "the fair use doctrine has never
given anyone a right to break other laws for the stated purpose of exer-
cising the fair use privilege. Fair use doesn't allow you to break into a
locked library in order to make 'fair use' copies of the books in it, or
steal newspapers from a vending machine in order to copy articles and
share them with a friend." 10 9 Similarly, museums have the right to re-
strict access to the many public domain works they hold on their prem-
ises-for example, by charging admission fees, prohibiting photography,
and determining which and when works will be displayed. 10 Although
Jessica Litman rightly pointed out that the "breaking and entering" meta-
phor was somewhat misleading because it overlooked the importance of
property rights in the physical establishment,"' there is no doubt that the
107. 144 Cong. Rec. S 11,887 (Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Senator John Ashcroft).
108. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 139 (explaining why the
DMCA affords greater protection to the copyright holders' right to control access); R. Anthony
Reese, Will Merging Access Controls and Rights Controls Undermine the Structure of Anticircum-
vention Law?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 619, 621 (2003) (stating that "Congress expressly provided
less protection for rights controls in order to allow consumers to make noninfringing uses of copy-
righted works in protected digital format, just as consumers have for centuries made noninfringing
uses of copyrighted works in unprotected analog copies").
109. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability Limitation
Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 208 (1997) (prepared statement of Allan Adler,
Association of American Publishers); see also Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at
140 (stating that "it may be fair use to make nonprofit research photocopies of pages from a lawfully
acquired book; it is not fair use to steal the book in order to make the photocopies").
110. As Michael Landau observed:
Museums have controlled access to public domain works by controlling how and when
people may view the works contained inside. Museums control access by charging ad-
mission to see public domain works. Museums also often prevent photography or other
reproduction of the works inside, many of which are in the public domain. In addition,
museums control access by determining which works will be on display and when. An
enormous number of works owned by museums are in storage at any given time. I have
not heard a public outcry against museums for limiting access.
Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Really Created a New Exclusive Right
of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users' and Content Providers' Rights, 49 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 277, 289 (2001); accord Dam, supra note 54, at 408-09 (stating that
"[t]he Louvre has the Mona Lisa, a prototypical public domain painting, but surely the Louvre is not
required to allow students and artists (or even art reviewers and parodists) to set up easels for copy-
ing it or to allow them to take photographs or even to admit them without charge to the museum so
that they can copy covertly").
111. As Jessica Litman explained:
The thing about houses is that property laws give homeowners legal control over who
gets to come in. A homeowner may therefore say: "My painting may be in the public
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metaphor has been effective as part of the overall lobbying efforts.' 12 In
fact, it partly accounts for the differential statutory treatment of access-
control and use-control technologies.
In practice, however, such differential treatment may not be as use-
ful as commentators have suggested. As Anthony Reese observed, copy-
right holders increasingly employ technological measures that incorpo-
rate both access-control and use-control technologies. "[C]ourts [also]
have treated such 'merged' control measures as entitled to the legal pro-
tections of both access- and rights-control measures, even when the sys-
tem was essentially directed only at preventing copying and distribution,
rather than at controlling access." ' 13 By upgrading the protection of use-
control technologies to the level of access-control technologies whenever
merged control mechanisms are deployed, these courts therefore have
"undercut[] the congressional intent in drafting the DMCA expressly to
allow circumvention of rights controls so long as the circumventor does
not engage in copyright infringement."'
' 14
Second, the existing regime has upset the historical balance between
copyright interests and access to information. 115  Some commentators,
notably Jane Ginsburg, have suggested that the DMCA has created a new
access right. 1 6  In addition, the DMCA has brought about many unin-
domain but I don't have to let you into my locked home to see it." Backed up by that le-
gal control, she can use protective devices-locks, burglar alarms, electrified fences, vi-
cious attack dogs-to keep outsiders out of her home and away from her painting. The
property laws about home ownership are what gives the locks and other devices their le-
gitimacy.
Without those property rights, however, the metaphor collapses. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that somebody used a lock or other protection measure (a well-trained attack dog,
say) to prevent strangers from viewing some painting she didn't own in some place she
didn't own. If I were to set my vicious attack dog to keep folks away from the Mona Lisa
in the Louvre Museum, the guards would simply shoot it.
LITMAN, supra note 14, at 133.
112. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 539 (observ-
ing that "[t]he 'breaking and entering' metaphor for circumvention activities swayed some influen-
tial Congressmen in the debate over anti-circumvention regulations").
113. Reese, supra note 108, at 621; see also id. (contending that "[t]he deployment of merged
control measures thus poses a threat to the congressional scheme for balancing protections for copy-
right owners against the public's interest in noninfringing use"); Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy
Puzzle, supra note 71, at 116 n.25 (stating that "[i]t is difficult to think of a circumstance where
circumvention of a copy-control measure would not also be prohibited as circumvention of a com-
mensurate access-control measure").
114. Reese, supra note 108, at 651.
115. See, e.g., Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 38 (stating that, because "TPMs could go on work-
ing indefinitely," "the ensuing policy issue is not merely a question of copyright's ability to balance
but also one of technology's power to control"); Lunney, supra note 15, at 814-15 (contending that
the DMCA transformed copyright into a "guild monopoly," similar to the monopoly the Stationers'
Company enjoyed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 285 (2001) (con-
tending that "the DMCA departs sharply from prior practice" in which Congress sought to limit the
impact of the changed information environment on research, education, and on libraries and their
users).
116. See Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 140-43 (discussing the right of
access); see also Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1103 (stating that "the DMCA
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tended consequences, chilling innovation and competition while raising
concerns about free speech, privacy, academic freedom, learning, scien-
tific advancement, cultural development, and democratic discourse."
7
Early reports of potential chilling effects and unintended consequences
included the disturbing episodes concerning the cease-and-desist letter
sent to computer science professor Edward Felten, the lawsuit to enjoin
2600: The Hacker Quarterly, the arrest of Russian cryptographer Dmitry
Sklyarov, and the subsequent failed criminal prosecution of Elcom-
Soft.
18
In recent years, the DMCA has also been misused to deter competi-
tion and interoperability in tangible products that only incidentally incor-
porated copyrightable software code." 9 Recent examples include Lex-
mark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 120 which
concerned laser printer toner cartridges, and Chamberlain Group, Inc v.
Skylink Technologies, Inc.,21 which involved universal garage door
openers. One may also add Sony's attempt to suppress distribution of
software tools among owners of its programmable 'Aibo' robot dogs.
22
Although all of these incidents are eventually resolved favorably in the
interests of consumers, it is important not to overlook the potential chill-
ing effect created by threatening cease-and-desist letters invoking the
anticircumvention provision of the DMCA. As Dan Burk reminded us,
"court action is always the exception, rather than the rule, in legal dis-
putes, ' 123 and there is no easy way to find out how often the DMCA has
been invoked in unreported letters.
Third, by protecting DRMs, the DMCA has undermined the protec-
tion of privacy of individual users. As Julie Cohen pointed out, the stat-
ute "threaten[s] to change rather substantially.. . the degree of informa-
tional and spatial privacy to which users of intellectual goods are enti-
as enacted creates a new and unprecedented right to control access to copyrighted works"); cf Tho-
mas Heide, Copyright in the E. U. and United States: What "Access Right"?, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 469 (2001) (contending that "the recent inclusion of the 'access right' within copyright does
not represent an evolution of copyright to extend to new forms of exploitation but rather the incorpo-
ration of a completely new rights structure into copyright law--one closely akin to that underlying
cinemas and theatres"); Wagner, Reconsidering the DMCA, supra note 35, at 1108-09 ("Congress
did not in fact alter the balance between copyright owners and the public .... Instead, Congress
attempted to alter the balance between law and software to respond to changes in the enforcement
environment by shifting the regulatory equilibrium back towards the law." (footnote omitted)).
117. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 725-26.
118. See id. at 724-25.
119. For excellent discussions of the unintended consequences of the DMCA, see generally
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2006),
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/DMCAunintended-v4.pdf; Lipton, Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, supra note 102. But see Richard Gooch, Requirements for DRM Systems, in DIGITAL
RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 16, 23 ("Of course misuse of any technology is possible, but
such issues do not arise more significantly with DRM than with any other technology.").
120. 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
121. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
122. See Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1113.
123. ld. at 1112.
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tied."'' 24 By collecting information about an individual's intellectual con-
sumption and exploration, DRM systems intrude upon the "the privacy
interest in (metaphoric) breathing space for thought, exploration, and
personal growth."1 25  In addition, the technologies "dictate the circum-
stances-the when, where, how, and how often-of one's own intellec-
tual consumption, unobserved and unobstructed by others" and therefore
threaten to take away the freedom to explore areas of intellectual interest
that an individual might not feel as free to explore in public. 126 Indeed,
the concern of privacy intrusion was so important that the DMCA in-
cludes a special but limited exception to enable circumvention in the
event that the circumventer needs to protect personally-identifying in-
formation. 127 Nevertheless, because the exception is limited, commenta-
tors have called for more expansive protection of privacy.' 
28
Finally, the expediency of the DMCA has been deeply undercut by
its failure to achieve its stated goals of reducing digital piracy. 29 As of
this writing, the DMCA has yet to reduce the amount of copyright in-
fringement on the Internet, and online file sharing remains widespread.
30
Although the content industries have billed the Content Scramble Sys-
tem131 ("CSS") deployed to protect copyrighted contents in DVDs as a
major success, the technology "was readily compromised, and ... free
124. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 594. For discussions of the impact of anticir-
cumvention laws on privacy, see generally id.; Lee A. Bygrave, Digital Rights Management and
Privacy-Legal Aspects in the European Union, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at
418; Ian R. Kerr, To Observe and Protect?: How Digital Rights Management Systems Threaten
Privacy and What Policy Makers Should Do About It, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE (Peter K. Yu ed., forthcoming
2006).
125. Cohen, DRMand Privacy, supra note 32, at 578.
126. Id. at 579.
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2004) (creating an exception to protect personally identifying
information).
128. See Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 609 (stating that, compared to both judi-
cial and regulatory sanctions, "[a] far more effective method of ensuring that information users
actually enjoy the privacy to which they are entitled would entail building privacy into the design of
DRM technologies in the first instance"); Kerr, supra note 124 (recommending countermeasures
needed to offset the new powers and protections afforded to TPM and DRM); see also Julie E.
Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (discussing how the proposed federal protection for digital copyright
management technologies has failed to protect an individual right to read anonymously).
129. See von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 636 (contending that "the DMCA fails in light of its
stated goal-namely, reducing the threat of copyright infringement in the digital age"). It is impor-
tant to note that, although the reduction of digital piracy is one of the important goals of the DMCA,
it is not the only one.
130. For discussions of illegal file sharing, see generally Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars,
supra note 28; Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8.
131. "CSS, or Content Scramble System, is an access control and copy prevention system for
DVDs developed by the motion picture companies, including plaintiffs. It is an encryption-based
system that requires the use of appropriately configured hardware such as a DVD player or a com-
puter DVD drive to decrypt, unscramble and play back, but not copy, motion pictures on DVDs."
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (footnote omitted);
see also Marks & Turnbull, supra note 54, at 212-13 (describing the CSS technology and its applica-
tion to DVDs).
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circumvention tools are in wide circulation across the Internet."' 132 It also
remains unclear whether the continued heavy sales of DVDs derive from
the success of the CSS or from the structural differences of the movie
industry and the inherently attractive features of the DVD medium. 1
33
In sum, the benefits created by TPM thus far are largely question-
able. It is problematic enough that the DMCA has many shortcomings
and unintended consequences. It is more disturbing that the statute may
have imposed these costs and burdens on society without bringing sig-
nificant benefits to copyright holders.
B. The International Regime
While the DMCA is problematic at the domestic level, it is even
more harmful at the international level. In general, due to the territorial
nature of intellectual property rights, the DMCA does not have any sig-
nificant extraterritorial effects. As a result, the DMCA is usually not
applicable to foreign nationals unless and until they conduct business in
the United States-a painful lesson Dmitry Sklyarov and his former em-
ployer ElcomSoft have learned.1
34
In recent years, however, the United States has actively pushed for
bilateral and plurilateral treaties that seek to achieve "a standard of pro-
tection similar to that found in United States law."' 135 Thanks to these
agreements, an anticircumvention regime that is modeled after the
DMCA has now been exported to foreign countries. Indeed, the DMCA
has emerged as the international standard for the implementation of the
WIPO Internet Treaties. Article 15.5.7 of the Central America-
Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, for example, transplanted
the DMCA onto the soils of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 36  Similar provisions
132. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 645.
133. See, e.g., id. at 645-46 (discussing the various features that make DVDs successful in the
face of darknet competition); Peter S. Mcneil, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 123-25 (2002) (highlighting the unique structure of the film industry); Peter K.
Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331,426-27 (2003) (discussing how the differences
between the movie and music industries may have impacted on the volume of illegal online file
sharing).
134. The creation of ElcomSoft's software, which removed security protection from Adobe e-
books, was not illegal under Russian Law. However, Sklyarov was arrested in the United States in
July 2001, after giving a presentation at a computer hacker convention. His Moscow-based em-
ployer was subsequently criminally prosecuted. In December 2002, a federal jury acquitted Elcom-
Soft of all charges. For a symposium discussing the criminal lawsuit against Sklyarov, see Sklyarov
Symposium Transcript, supra note 62.
135. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(I)
(2004) (stating that one of the principal negotiating objectives of the free trade agreements is to
"ensur[e] that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual
property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that
found in United States law").
136. Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, May 28, 2004, art. 15.5.7
[hereinafter CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/
CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinal Texts/asset uploadfile934_3935.pdf.
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are found in all of the other free trade agreements the United States has
reached in recent years-with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, Mo-
rocco, Oman, and Singapore.1
37
Even worse for these countries, the protection under the free trade
agreements is often stronger than what is required under the DMCA.
This type of DMCA-plus legislation is particularly troublesome because
less developed countries actually need to have greater access to informa-
tion and knowledge than their developed counterparts. While the anticir-
cumvention regime required by the agreements still includes many nar-
row exceptions commonly found in the DMCA, it omits other important
ones and has made it more difficult for the signatory countries to intro-
duce new exceptions.138  For example, the Central America-Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement allows for exceptions for noninfringing
uses of a copyrighted work only
when an actual or likely adverse impact on those noninfringing uses
is demonstrated in a legislative or administrative proceeding by sub-
stantial evidence; provided that in order for any such exception to
remain in effect for more than four years, a Party must conduct a re-
view before the expiration of the four-year period and at intervals of
at least every four years thereafter, pursuant to which it is demon-
strated in such a proceeding by substantial evidence that there is a
continuing actual or likely adverse impact on the particular nonin-
fringing use.139
To be certain, this "substantial evidence" standard is similar to the
one adopted by the Copyright Office in the first DMCA rulemaking pro-
137. See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., art.
17.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/
FinalText/asset upload file469_5141.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, Sept. 14, 2004, U.S.-Bahrain, art. 14.4.7, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Bahrain-FTA/final-texts/asset-upload-file211 6
293.pdf; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.7.5, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Fina-Texts/asset-upload-
file912_4011 .pdf; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, art. 4.13, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html; United States-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, June 15, 2004, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.5.8, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco-FTA/FlnaIText/asset upload-fil
e797_3849.pdf; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Gov-
emnment of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Jan. 19, 2006, U.S.-
Oman, art. 15.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Oman
FTA/FinalText/assetupload_file715_8809.pdf; United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,
May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.4.7, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/TradeAgreements/
Bilateral/Singapore- FTA/FinalTexts/asset_uploadfile708_4036.pdf. For a recent discussion of
some of these agreements, see Anupam Chander, Exporting DMCA Lockouts, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
205, 212-16 (2006).
138. Compare CAFTA-DR, supra note 136, art. 15.5.7, with 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)-1201(j).
139, CAFTA-DR, supra note 136, art. 15.5.7(e)(iii).
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ceeding in 2000.140 However, the standard successfully shifts the burden
of proof governments of less developed countries usually adopt when
determining whether they need to introduce new exceptions and limita-
tions to the copyright system. To some extent, it reminds one of David
McGowan's observation that "the legal endgame [has now become one
that] place[s] the burden of proof on the other side.' 4 1 Because less de-
veloped countries now have to "prove the unprovable facts,"'142 they are
less likely to be able to introduce exceptions to protect noninfringing
uses.
To help understand why an international anticircumvention regime
is more harmful than its domestic counterpart, this Part discusses the
serious mismatch between the regime and the local conditions of less
developed countries, the insufficient empirical evidence needed to dem-
onstrate the need or expediency of such a regime, and the greater unin-
tended consequences created by the regime for less developed countries.
This Part also explains how an international anticircumvention regime
may ultimately backfire on the United States when it forces other coun-
tries to expand their domestic protection without providing significant
benefits in return.
1. Mismatch with Local Conditions
To begin with, the DMCA was designed specifically to deal with
the threat created by digital technologies under conditions specific to the
United States, including the stage of its economic development, the
structure of its content and communications industries, the state of avail-
able technology, the overall market conditions, and the average living
standards of local consumers. Because these conditions are unlikely to
be present in less developed countries, the DMCA serves as an inappro-
priate model for the implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties. In
fact, the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights has advised
against the adoption of similar legislation by less developed countries.
As the Commission stated in its final report:
We believe developing countries would probably be unwise to en-
dorse the WIPO Copyright Treaty, unless they have very specific
reasons for doing so, and should retain their freedom to legislate on
technological measures. It follows that developing countries, or in-
deed other developed countries, should not follow the example of the
DMCA in forbidding all circumvention of technological protection.
In particular, we take the view that legislation such as the DMCA
140. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558-59
(2000) (discussing the respective burdens of proponents and opponents of any classes of works to be
exempted from the prohibition on circumvention).
141. McGowan, supra note 5, at 2.
142. Id.
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shifts the balance too far in favour of producers of copyright material
at the expense of the historic rights of users. Its replication globally
could be very harmful to the interests of developing countries in ac-
cessing information and knowledge they require for their develop-
ment. 
143
It is important to remember that the DMCA is not the only way, but
one of the many possible ways, to implement the WIPO Internet Treaties.
As Ian Kerr, Alana Maurushat, and Christian Tacit noted:
it is clear that there is no singular correct approach to interpreting ar-
ticles 11 [of the WCT] and 18 [of the WPPT]. The WCT and WPPT
provide WIPO Members with large degrees of latitude as to how a
particular state might choose to fulfill its obligations with respect to
the relevant provisions. Consequently, there is considerable flexibil-
ity as to how [each country] might implement these provisions,
should the Government elect to ratify the two WIPO Treaties.
44
Thus, countries can comply with the treaties without ever introducing an
anticircumvention regime. In the context of the United States, for exam-
ple, Pamela Samuelson contended that "the DMCA was largely unneces-
sary to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty because U.S. law already
complied with all but one minor provision of that treaty [concerning the
protection of the integrity of rights management information]." 145 Dan
Burk cited the common law "doctrine of contributory infringement,
which attributes copyright liability to providers of technical devices that
lack a substantial noninfringing use. 146 Indeed, in light of the substan-
tial overlap between the treaty and then-existing U.S. law, "the Clinton
Administration initially considered whether the WIPO Copyright Treaty
might even be sent to the Senate for ratification 'clean' of implementing
legislation.,
147
Even if anticircumvention protection is needed, the DMCA may not
serve as a good model. As Jessica Litman noted, "[aIll the [WCT] re-
quired, and all that made policy sense, was to give copyright owners
remedies against people who circumvented technological protection in
aid of infringement and redress against others-including device makers
143. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 108.
144. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36; see also Geist, supra note 100, at 214 (arguing that "there
is a fairly diverse array of implementing provisions, demonstrating that the US model found in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, is but one approach open to Canada").
145. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 521 & n. 10;
see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36 (stating that "article II of the WCT does not require anti-
circumvention measures to be integrated into copyright legislation").
146. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1103. But see 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.01 [C] (Perm. ed. 2006) (explaining why
the Sony standard of being "capable of a commercially significant noninfringing use" may not meet
the treaty requirement of providing "adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against
circumvention").
147. Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 530.
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and sellers-who deliberately facilitated circumvention for an infringing
purpose. ' 148 Likewise, Coenraad Visser reminded us that the treaty "is
much more limited than the wording of the DMCA. It does not strike at
manufacturing devices; it strikes only at the actual circumvention."
' 149
In fact, from Australia to Japan, countries have implemented the
WIPO Internet Treaties differently. 5° Likewise, the EU Information
Society Directive, which sought to implement the treaties, differs from
the DMCA in providing an additional requirement that each member
state
take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make available
to the beneficiary of [the specified] exception or limitation provided
for in national law... the means of benefiting from that exception or
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or
limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected
work or subject-matter concerned.15 1
Some commentators even suggested that the treaties can be implemented
by adopting legislation outside the copyright system (and the greater
copyright system that includes paracopyright laws). Ian Kerr and others,
for example, noted that the protection of technological measures "could
be dealt with in other kinds of legislation, such as criminal law or compe-
tition law.'
152
Moreover, although the digital revolution affects both developed
and less developed countries, these countries face different challenges
and obtain different benefits from the opportunities created by the Inter-
net and new media technologies. While the Internet serves mainly as a
communication medium or a commercial marketplace for the United
States and other developed countries, it provides for many less developed
countries an important leapfrogging tool to catch up with their more de-
veloped counterparts. 153 To take advantage of this leapfrogging tool, less
developed countries pushed aggressively for the recognition of the im-
portance of access to information and knowledge in the recent World
Summit on the Information Society. 5 4  In that forum, and elsewhere,
148. LITMAN, supra note 14, at 132.
149. Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 854 (remarks of Professor Coenraad
Visser of the University of South Africa).
150. See Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 58-60 (discussing anticircumvention regimes in Australia
and Japan).
151. Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisa-
tion of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society art. 6(4), 2001
O.J. (L 167) 10.
152. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 36-37.
153. See Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (contending that "[t]he information revolution also might
allow the less developed countries to catch up with the developed countries by leapfrogging stages
of technological, industrial, and infrastructural development").
154. See World Summit on the Information Society, Dec. 10-12, 2003, Declaration of Princi-
ples, U.N. Doe. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
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they have also questioned the compatibility of intellectual property pro-
tection with their development goals.' 55 Their position is understandable.
As James Boyle noted in the early days of the Internet, "[t]he intellectual
property regime could make or break the educational, political, scientific,
and cultural promise of the Net."'' 56  Thus, strong intellectual property
protection not only may not be in the interest of less developed countries,
but may take away their rare opportunities to catch up with their more
developed counterparts.
To make matters worse, the DMCA is based on three assumptions
that may be invalid in the less developed world. The first assumption
concerns the claim that most works will exist in both DRM and non-
DRM formats. If consumers are unhappy with the protected format, or if
that format prevents users from enjoying noninfringing uses, they can
always switch to an identical product in an unprotected format. 57  In
United States v. Elcom Ltd. , for example, the court reminded us that
the DMCA "does not 'prevent access to matters in the public domain' or
allow any publisher to remove from the public domain and acquire rights
in any public domain work."'159 Rather, it allows copyright holders to
"gain[] a technological protection against copying that particular elec-
tronic version of the work.'
160
While the Elcom court's assumption that copyrighted works are al-
ways available in both protected and unprotected formats is invalid even
in developed countries, 161 it is particularly problematic in the less devel-
http://www.itu.int/dmspub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/SO3-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf; World Sum-
mit on the Information Society, Nov. 16-18, 2005, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WSIS-
05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. l)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/
off/6revl.html.
155. For an excellent discussion of how to recalibrate intellectual property protection in light of
the development concept, see generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
156. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE
L.J. 87, 89 (1997).
157. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558
(2000) (considering a mitigating factor "when a work as to which the copyright owner has instituted
a technological control is also available in formats that are not subject to technological protections");
Reese, supra note 108, at 653 ("Motion pictures ... are today often available both on DVD, pro-
tected by CSS, and on videocassette, unprotected by CSS, perhaps alleviating some concerns about
the difficulty a consumer might have in circumventing CSS to engage in noninfringing use of a film
that she owns on DVD"); Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 841-44 (discussing
whether consumers can exercise fair use despite strong DRM systems); id. at 841 (observing that "a
lot of these e-books will be published as normal, printed books") (remarks of Eric Smith of the
International Intellectual Property Alliance); id. at 842 (stating that "absolutely nothing under the
law stops you from displaying the text on the screen and sitting there and typing into your own hard
drive whatever portions of the book you want to type in") (remarks of Bruce Lehman, former Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
158. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
159. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention
of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558
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oped world,162 which faces an acute shortage of copyrighted works. As
the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights observed:
In the tertiary sector, the evidence indicates that access to books and
other materials for education and research remains a critical problem
in many developing countries, particularly the poorest. Most devel-
oping countries remain heavily dependent on imported textbooks and
reference books, as this sector is often not commercially feasible for
struggling local publishers to enter. The prices of such books are be-
yond the means of most students. 16
3
Even worse, a copy-protected copy on the Internet sometimes may be the
only available copy. Even materials that are in the public domain of de-
veloped countries may not be available in those countries.
Moreover, although the WIPO Internet Treaties, the DMCA, and
similar anticircumvention laws do not extend to public domain materials,
it is naive to assume that these materials are always freely available.'
64
Today, public domain works are increasingly bundled with copyrighted
materials, such as copyrighted introduction or editorial comments.1 65 As
(2000) (reporting that commenters have submitted a number of databases and indexes "that were
available only in digital form"). But see Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United
States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 363 (2004) [hereinafter Bechtold, Digital Rights Man-
agement] ("DRM systems will never be able to cordon off content completely. File-sharing net-
works will continue to exist, movies and photos can be captured from a computer screen, and music
can be re-recorded from a loudspeaker.").
162. Challenging this position, Jane Ginsburg suggested that the assumption that works will be
available only in encrypted formats "may be more true for some works, such as software, digital
sound recordings, and databases, than for others, such as books and other literary works." Ginsburg,
Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at 153-54. She also explained that "many documents (fre-
quently composed of noncopyrightable information) have been the objects of limited distribution and
site licenses or shrink-wrap licenses that contractually limit the library's or user's ability to dispose
of the information disclosed in the document." Id. at 153 n.52. Nevertheless, it remains debatable
whether these licenses would hold up in court. In addition, Professor Ginsburg pointed out that
"copyright owners may not choose to restrict access to every copy,... [and that] copies will often
still be available for anonymous consultation (and limited copying) in places such as public libraries
(who, under the analysis offered earlier, are entitled to circumvent access and anti-copying codes,
under appropriate circumstances)." Id. at 154.
163. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 103.
164. Examples that easily come to mind are the public domain materials included in Lexis-
Nexis and Westlaw databases and those public domain movies shown on subscription-based cable
television channels. To these content providers, "what is being sold is not the work itself but rather,
the service of delivering it." MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE: SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND
TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES FOR A NETWORKED WORLD 94 (1999).
165. As Alfred Yen described:
Bundling happens all the time. History books contain copies of the Constitution and let-
ters by historical figures that have passed into the public domain. Telephone books con-
tain both copyrightable yellow pages and uncopyrightable white pages. Law school
casebooks combine the copyrightable commentary of authors with public domain cases.
If such works were to be distributed in digital form, then the publishers could implement
DRM schemes that limit the uses a digital reader could make of these works. The DRM
scheme might not allow any printing of the book, or it might not allow any copying of the
book. It might even restrict the number of times a person can read the book.
Yen, supra note 71, at 674; accord NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 146, § 12A.06[B][1] (stating that
"[plublishers are free to take old works that have fallen into the public domain, to add a bit of origi-
nal material to them, and to claim a copyright in the newly released whole" (footnote omitted));
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a result, the bundled materials, including both the copyrighted and public
domain portions, will be protected by technological measures supported
by the anticircumvention regime. 166 Because many less developed coun-
tries lack a choice of materials in both protected and unprotected formats,
sophisticated DRM systems "may exclude access to these materials alto-
gether and impose a heavy burden that will delay the participation of
those countries in the global knowledge-based society."'
167
The second assumption concerns the availability of decryption tools
or technological expertise to perform the needed circumvention as al-
lowed under the narrowly-crafted exceptions. Because of their inevitable
dual-use nature and the continued merger of access-control and use-
control technologies,1 68 decryption tools are unlikely to be widely avail-
able. The limited Internet connectivity in many of these countries has
also reduced access to these tools, although such access will increase as
connectivity improves.
Even if the needed decryption tools are available, it is very likely
that these tools or related services will have to be imported into less de-
veloped countries until they can develop their own technological exper-
tise. Less developed countries are therefore at the mercy of their devel-
oped counterparts. If circumvention technologies are banned in the ex-
porting developed countries, less developed countries may not be able to
obtain access to protected works even if they manage to obtain an excep-
tion in the international intellectual property agreements to prevent the
decryption tools or services from being outlawed in their own countries.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1108 (stating that "copyrightable content is
typically mixed with uncopyrightable content, which will also be under the control of the techno-
logical protection system"); see also Nimmer, A Riffon Fair Use, supra note 44, at 712 (stating that
"[p]ublishers are free to take old works that have fallen into the public domain, to add a bit of origi-
nal material to them, and to claim a copyright in the newly released whole" (footnote omitted)).
166. In addition to technological measures, restrictive licenses have also been employed to
protect these works (and other copyrighted works). The adverse impact of these licenses, however,
is likely to be less severe than that of technological measures due to the underdeveloped legal sys-
tems and lax enforcement of laws in many of these countries. The law concerning the enforceability
of shrinkwrap and clickwrap mass market licenses is also unsettled and varies from country to coun-
try.
167. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 106.
168. As Professor Lunney explained:
Dealing with decryption technology is difficult because the same decryption technology
that enables the making of a non-infringing copy of a creative work also enables the mak-
ing of an infringing copy. A decryption tool that enables a teacher to prepare a few spur-
of-the moment copies for the classroom is the same decryption tool that enables a perni-
cious pirate to duplicate the work for resale. Moreover, unless lawful access to decryp-
tion technology is severely restricted, the widespread dissemination of decryption tech-
nology is almost inevitable. Because decryption technology is usually readily portable
and easily duplicated, it will likely prove impossible to contain. If every librarian,
teacher, or researcher with a potential fair use claim is allowed to possess decryption
technology, it will be all but impossible to keep the technology out of the hands of those
who intend unlawful uses.
Lunney, supra note 15, at 820; see also Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1106
(stating that "enacting a sweeping blanket prohibition with discrete exceptions is a foolish approach
to legislation covering multipurpose technologies").
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To some extent, the plight of less developed countries in the cir-
cumvention area is similar to the access-to-medicines problems they cur-
rently experience. Lacking the technical capacity to develop or manufac-
ture drugs, these countries often have to import pharmaceutical products
from abroad-regardless of whether these products are on- or off-patent.
While there is no doubt that the access-to-medicines problem has an im-
mediate and arguably more severe impact, the access-to-circumvention-
tools problem will touch on education and cultural development and will
therefore have a more lasting impact.
To deal with the access-to-medicines problem, the WTO member
states have adopted a proposal to amend the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 69 ("TRIPs Agreement")
to allow member states with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to
import generic versions of on-patent pharmaceuticals. 70 If DRM sys-
tems are widely deployed throughout the world and if they have pre-
vented people in less developed countries from having access to basic
educational and research materials, a similar exception may be needed to
enlarge access to the needed circumvention tools or services. 171 Indeed,
many international intellectual property treaties already contain technol-
ogy transfer and technical assistance provisions that can be easily ex-
tended to these tools. Article 67 of the TRIPs Agreement, for example,
requires developed countries to provide technical and financial coopera-
tion to less and least developed countries "on request and on mutually
agreed terms and conditions.
' 172
The final assumption states that the DMCA only creates inconven-
ience. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit de-
clared in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,173 it "kn[e]w of no au-
169. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 1.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement].
170. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of
Paragraph 11 of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Proposal for a Deci-
sion on an Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news05_e/trips decision-e.doc. For a discussion of proposed
article 31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement, see generally Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure
Movement, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssm.com/abstract-896134.
171. Scholars have advanced proposals to amend domestic circumvention laws to facilitate the
provision of this type of assistance. See, e.g., Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note
71, at 120 (advancing a proposal to develop an administrative complaint mechanism to assist indi-
viduals who seek to obtain legitimate uses of copyrighted works); Tian Yijun, Problems of Anti-
Circumvention Rules in the DMCA & More Heterogeneous Solutions, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 749, 785 (2005) (stating that "a future DMCA amendment should provide spe-
cific legal mechanisms to help eligible users obtain necessary circumvention assistance from the
appointed government agency when these users are not capable of circumventing the technological
protection measures by themselves").
172. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 169, art. 67.
173. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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thority for the proposition that fair use, as protected by the Copyright
Act, much less the Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum
method or in the identical format of the original.' 74 Likewise, in United
States v. Elcom Ltd., 75 the court explained that fair use is still available
even though "[t]he fair user may find it more difficult to engage in cer-
tain fair uses with regard to electronic books.' 7 6  These observations
were similar to the position articulated by Jesse Feder when he was the
Acting Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs of the
United States Copyright Office: "[T]he ability to make a perfect digital
reproduction of something is not something that is inherent in fair use.
Fair use entails copying, but it does not have to be a perfect digital re-
production."1
77
From the perspectives of the proponents, judges, and officials, the
DMCA has adequately preserved the users' ability to obtain legitimate
access through traditional analog means even though it may have re-
duced consumer convenience. 178 Consumers may not be able to make
copies "by the optimum method or in the identical format of the origi-
nal."'179 However, they can always do so by employing analog fixation
devices and techniques-sometimes as simple as the use of pen and pa-
per. As the Second Circuit noted in Corley, the DMCA continues to
allow one
to make a variety of traditional fair uses of DVD movies, such as
commenting on their content, quoting excerpts from their screen-
plays, and even recording portions of the video images and sounds on
film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or a microphone at a
monitor as it displays the DVD movie. 180
What the court did not mention is that the use of these analog tools
and techniques "will often be costly or impractical."' 8' As Alfred Yen
174. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459 (emphasis added).
175. 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
176. Elcom, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 1134-35.
177. Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 843-44 (remarks of Jesse Feder, former
Acting Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs of the United States Copyright Of-
fice).
178. Jane Ginsburg questioned whether, "[w]hen the public increasingly expects to acquire
works with a click of a mouse, . . .the law should stand back while third-party entrepreneurs en-
deavor to make works available without authorization in the most copy-convenient format (and
without compensation for resulting copies)?" Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation, supra note 14, at
154. Bruce Lehman went even further to remark that he did not believe that the DMCA has made it
inconvenient for consumers to exercise fair use. As he stated, "It is not more cumbersome at all. It is
just exactly the same as it has always been." Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 844
(remarks of Bruce Lehman, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office).
179. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
180. Id.
181. Yen, supra note 71, at 678; see also Landau, supra note 110, at 298 (stating that
"[a]lthough 'fair use' does not guarantee the making of the most efficient copies, the DMCA should
not mandate the most inefficient").
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pointed out, these alternatives sometimes require the purchase of analog
equipment as well as the technical expertise to set up such equipment.
The inferior results of analog reproduction also raise the question "[w]hy
should the rights holders benefit from the new opportunities of DRM
systems in order to protect their legitimate interests, while the beneficiar-
ies of a copyright limitation have to fall back on an inferior and some-
times outdated version of the work in order to carry out their legitimate
interests?"1
83
Moreover, inconvenience in one nation may be inaccessibility in
another. Due to limited resources and the lack of infrastructure devel-
opment in many less developed countries, inconvenience can become
such a heavy burden that would eliminate access entirely.1 84 As June
Besek noted in the Kemochan Center report, "there is a continuum be-
tween 'inconvenient' and 'impossible.' There may well be circum-
stances in which the exercise of a privilege is so inconvenient as to be
impossible, as a practical matter.'
185
Finally, there is no guarantee that the traditional analog means of
noninfringing uses will always be available in the near future. "[S]ome
copyright owners [already] have expressed a desire to use technology,
perhaps backed by legal requirements, to 'plug the analog hole' and pre-
vent such copying of copyrighted works.' ' 186  If the analog hole is
plugged, or severely shrunk, anticircumvention legislation is more than a
mere inconvenience.
2. Lack of Empirical Evidence
Thus far, there has been insufficient empirical proof to conclusively
demonstrate whether an anticircumvention regime will be expedient, or
even needed, in less developed countries. There has also been limited
evidence about whether the extensive use of DRM systems would benefit
these countries. On the one hand, due to lax enforcement of intellectual
property laws, these systems, along with strong anticircumvention pro-
tection, will provide foreign rights holders with the needed protection to
make the products available in the first place. If they decide to relocate
their manufacturing plants to take advantage of the lower labor, produc-
tion, and distribution costs, such protection will also help bring the des-
perately needed foreign direct investments. In countries that have wide
digital distribution of culture-based materials, DRM systems may even
182. See Yen, supra note 71, at 679 (stating that the use of video camera to make fair use of
DVDs "requires the purchase of an appropriate camera and the effort of setting up the camera so that
a serviceable image can be captured").
183. Bechtold, Digital Rights Management, supra note 161, at 363.
184. Thanks to Mark Schultz for reminding me of this important point.
185. Besek, supra note 36, at 481.
186. Reese, supra note 108, at 653; see also Susan P. Crawford, The Biology of the Broadcast
Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603, 618-21 (2003) (providing an overview of the "analog
hole").
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help protect the integrity of those materials. Such protection therefore
would benefit the local people if it would not make the materials unaf-
fordable.
On the other hand, as pointed out above, the deployment of sophis-
ticated DRM systems will make the products expensive and inaccessible
to a large number of people in these countries. While in theory DRM
systems allow for price discrimination, in reality foreign rights holders
rarely do so, for at least two reasons. First, many of them are concerned
that the discounted products would flow back as parallel imports to their
primary markets in the developed world and emerging economies.
187
Second, because of highly uneven distribution of wealth in these coun-
tries, foreign content providers may choose to price their products based
on the demand of the "more affluent minority," rather than the larger and
poorer majority. 188 Thus, instead of providing greater consumer choices
and cheaper products, the widespread deployment of DRM systems will
generally reduce access to materials that are needed for education, sci-
ence, and cultural development.
One may still argue that the use of DRM systems will encourage
people in less developed countries to consume local products that are not
in copy-protected formats. Although this argument is valid in some
cases, it is unlikely that the benefits accrued from such diversion would
outweigh the costs of reduced access. After all, the high prices of for-
eign products also encourage people in less developed countries to con-
sume the cheaper, local products. However, it would be difficult to ar-
gue that these countries should encourage high prices for foreign prod-
ucts for that particular reason. Moreover, there may not always be local
alternatives for the needed products. Nor may there always be alterna-
tives in unprotected format. With increased globalization and the de-
mand generated by the "more affluent minority" in these countries, many
187. See Yu, The Copyright Divide, supra note 133, at 436 (noting the concern of backflow of
discounted products as parallel imports).
188. This reason, indeed, is one of the primary reasons why price discrimination of pharmaceu-
ticals does not occur in many less developed countries. See F.M. SCHERER & JAYASHREE WATAL,
POST-TRIPS OPTIONS FOR ACCESS TO PATENTED MEDICINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 45
(Comm'n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No. WG4:l, 2001), available at
http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paperl.pdf; Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian Towse, Theory and
Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 425, 455
(Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (noting that "pricing in some [developed
countries] is dominated by the demands of small, affluent populations, resulting in prices that are
unaffordable to the majority of poorer people"); Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential
Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563, 566 (2002) (stating that "phar-
maceutical firms and their distributors in poor countries may find it more profitable to sell drugs in
low volumes and high prices to wealthier patients with price-inelastic demand rather than in high
volumes at low prices to poorer patients"); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note
170 (explaining why pharmaceutical companies prefer not to price discriminate their products in less
developed countries).
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of the needed local products may even be copy-protected or manufac-
tured by multinational corporations that seek to sell the products abroad.
In sum, there is no conclusive evidence that the use of DRM sys-
tems would benefit less developed countries. Without such evidence, it
remains unclear whether an anticircumvention regime would be expedi-
ent, or even needed, in these countries. While strong anticircumvention
protection may bring in some benefits-such as a potential increase in
foreign investment and the protection of culture-based materials-it is
likely to result in high prices and restricted access. In my view, the bene-
fits of an anticircumvention regime to less developed countries are
speculative and therefore would not outweigh its costs.
Even worse, such a regime may be a risky gamble that these coun-
tries cannot afford. If the anticircumvention regime does not strike an
appropriate balance between proprietary interests and public access
needs, it is likely to cause more damage to less developed countries than
to their developed counterparts. Many less developed countries have
neither the correction mechanisms nor the expertise or resources to intro-
duce mechanisms to correct the imbalance.1 89  In the developed world,
commentators have proposed to adjust the balance of the anticircumven-
tion regime by using the following correction mechanisms: antitrust or
competition law, 190 the misuse doctrine,' 9' a mixed fair use infrastructure
with automatic fair use defaults and a key escrow system,' 92 an adminis-
trative complaint mechanism and an appeal procedure, 193 a verification
system based on gun control laws, 194 the provision of circumvention ser-
189. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 4 which states that:
[W]e consider that, if anything, the costs of getting the IP system 'wrong' in a developing
country are likely to be far higher than in developed countries. Most developed countries
have sophisticated systems of competition regulation to ensure that abuses of any mo-
nopoly rights cannot unduly affect the public interest.
Id.; KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 237 (2000)
(noting that developed countries "have mature legal systems of corrective interventions" where "the
exercise of IPRs threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
190. See, e.g., Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 619 (stating that antitrust con-
cerns need to be taken into account when analyzing DRM-related developments); Zohar Efroni, A
Momentary Lapse of Reason: Digital Copyright, the DMCA and a Dose of Common Sense, 28
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 249, 266 (2005) (noting that "grounds for constraining the power to
prohibit access might be found in legal sources external to copyright law, for instance, in antitrust
law"); Geist, supra note 100, at 246-48 (proposing to respond to the introduction of anticircumven-
tion protection by making parallel amendments to the Canadian Competition Act "to ensure that the
Competition Bureau is not restricted in its ability to bring actions against abusive behaviour stem-
ming from the application of an anti-circumvention right"); Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puz-
zle, supra note 71, at 491 (stating that "[iut is important that the DMCA does not become a tool for
those engaging in potentially questionable tying practices to distract attention from their possible
antitrust violations by claiming copyright and DMCA infringements against a commercial competi-
tor").
191. See generally Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102; John R. Therien, Com-
ment, Exorcising the Specter of a "Pay-Per-Use" Society: Toward Preserving Fair Use and the
Public Domain in the Digital Age, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979, 1041-42 (2001).
192. See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 45.
193. See generally Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71.
194. See generally Yen, supra note 71.
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vice providers,' 95 and the development of DRM systems that are engi-
neered to protect the process of fair use.' 96 All of these legal doctrines
and infrastructures are likely to be costly and thus unavailable in the less
developed world.
Indeed, many countries lack the needed resources and expertise to
put in place both an anticircumvention regime and a follow-up correction
mechanism. It is important to remember that many of these countries
institute or revamp their intellectual property systems in the first place
mainly because of the TRIPs Agreement or external pressure from the
developed world, such as what they currently experience in their bilateral
and plurilateral trade negotiations.' 97 Oftentimes, they introduce reforms
in the fear of losing trade benefits, export markets, and development
aid. 98 If they had a choice to select the type of innovation systems they
wanted to build, an anticircumvention regime would be very unlikely to
be a top priority. After all, economists have shown empirically that
countries with limited imitative capacity often do not benefit from a
strong intellectual property regime. '99
Even if these countries have the needed expertise to introduce cor-
rection mechanisms after they completed their reforms, they may have
exhausted their resources after strengthening the intellectual property
system. Even worse, local policymakers may have used up their limited
political capital for anticircumvention reforms, especially if the earlier
reforms turn out to be unsuccessful.20 0 Under that scenario, local re-
formers will not only have to deal with resistance in the country and to
justify the short-term economic losses, but they will also have lost credi-
bility to introduce new reforms. After the failure of the earlier reforms,
the resistance to the later reforms is likely to be severe even if the goals
of those follow-up reforms are to correct the imbalance of the earlier
ones.
195. See Besek, supra note 36, at 509-10 (discussing circumvention service providers).
196. See generally Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair
Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract id=885371.
197. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 373-
75 (2006) (discussing the coercive narrative of the origins of the TRIPs Agreement). But see Ed-
mund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994)
(suggesting that less developed countries agreed to stronger intellectual property protection because
they found such protection in their self-interests). Although I agree with Professor Kitch's argu-
ments about how the TRIPs Agreement can be in the self-interests of less developed countries,
especially those with strong imitative capacities, I have serious doubts that these countries saw the
strengthening of intellectual property standards as pursuits of their own self-interests during the
TRIPs negotiations.
198. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 170; see also Frederick Ab-
bott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 36, 43 (Christophe Bell-
mann et al. eds., 2003) (stating that many less developed countries remain "highly dependent on the
developed countries as the source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World Bank,
or through investment bankers and securities exchanges").
199. See, e.g., MASKUS, supra note 189, at 116-19.
200. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 170.
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3. Unintended Consequences
An anticircumvention regime may create unintended consequences
that would greatly hurt consumers in less developed countries. For ex-
ample, it may require new supporting technology and equipment that
may be nonexistent or highly unaffordable in less developed countries.
Even in the developed world, consumer advocates have been worried
that the introduction of copy-protected CDs, which may not be playable
on older car stereos, personal computers, and CD players, may force con-
sumers to buy new hardware they do not otherwise need or cannot af-
ford. Indeed, when Sony released Celine Dion's album as an encrypted
CD in 2002, consumer advocates called for record companies to properly
label those CDs to avoid confusion and to allow consumers to choose
away from those products. 201 Two California consumers even filed a
class action lawsuit against the major record labels.2°2
While it is already problematic in developed countries to require
consumers to purchase new devices that support the technological meas-
ures employed, it would be particularly disturbing if the anticircumven-
tion regime required consumers in less developed countries to purchase
new end devices that they could not find or afford. By definition, less
developed countries have few resources, and people there have very lim-
ited disposable income. Some may even have a difficult time meeting
such basic needs as clean drinking water, food, shelter, electricity,
schools, and basic health care. While it is hard, though not impossible,
to explain why people in such circumstances need copyrighted Holly-
wood movies or popular music, technological measures have also been
used to restrict access to basic educational products and research materi-
als. Thus, an anticircumvention regime that renders household products
obsolete is likely to have a very significant impact on less developed
countries-much greater than the impact on its developed counterparts.
4. Backdoor Lawmaking
The anticircumvention regime that the United States exported
abroad may come back to haunt the American people.20 3 The WIPO
Internet Treaties are a good example of what I have called "backdoor
lawmaking"-a process of outsourcing the legislative process to an in-
201. See George Cole, Celine Dion and the Copycats, FIN. TIMES, July 19, 2002, at 11; Kevin
Hunt, Record Industry Opens Attack on Consumer Rights, HARTFORD COURANT, May 23, 2002, at
21; Peter K. Yu, How the Motion Picture and Recording Industries Are Losing the Copyright War by
Fighting Misdirected Battles, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020815_yu.html (Aug. 15, 2002).
202. See Jon Healey & Jeff Leeds, Record Labels Grapple with CD Protection, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2002, 3, at 1 (reporting that "two California consumers... have filed a class-action lawsuit
against the five major record companies, alleging that copy-protected CDs are defective products
that shouldn't be allowed on the market").
203. Anupam Chander recently published an article expressing similar concerns. See Chander,
supra note 137, at 206 (expressing concern that the United States "may be exporting our all-too-
narrow vision of intellectual property to many of our trading partners").
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ternational forum of unelected representatives in an effort to create laws
that the domestic legislature would not have otherwise enacted.2 °4 This
type of lawmaking is rent seeking at its best.
As far as anticircumvention protection is concerned, there are two
different sets of backdoors-or "double backdoors" as I have sometimes
called them. The United States began by going to a multilateral forum-
WIPO in this case205-to create international standards based on laws
that its domestic legislature was reluctant to enact (first backdoor). °6
These resulting standards traveled back to the United States in the form
of international obligations that provided the needed momentum for the
enactment of the DMCA. Then, it used bilateral or plurilateral free trade
agreements to induce other countries that have yet to ratify or implement
the WIPO Internet Treaties to enact laws that implement DMCA-like
standards (second backdoor). Eventually, these bilateral or plurilateral
standards wil return to the United States to further affect its domestic
legislative process. In both scenarios, harmonization and international
legal obligations provided the domestic legislature with politically ac-
ceptable justifications to enact laws that it had originally deemed unap-
pealing from the domestic standpoint. What is particularly disturbing is
204. As I noted earlier:
From the standpoint of democratic governance, these bilateral agreements are particularly
problematic, because they seek to circumvent the political process by using "negotiation
backdoors" through which government officials can achieve what these officials other-
wise could not achieve before Congress. By pushing controversial legislation into inter-
national fora, these officials are more likely to secure international agreements that, in
turn, would convince Congress to enact implementing legislation that would not be
adopted in the first place.
Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 323, 397-98 (2004).
205. As Pamela Samuelson noted:
The digital agenda that Clinton administration officials pursued in Geneva was almost
identical to the digital agenda they had put before the U.S. Congress during roughly the
same time period. Notwithstanding the fact that this digital agenda had proven so con-
troversial in the U.S. Congress that the bills to implement it were not even reported out of
committee, Clinton administration officials persisted in promoting these proposals in Ge-
neva and pressing for an early diplomatic conference to adopt them. For a time, it ap-
peared that administration officials might be able to get in Geneva what they could not
get from the U.S. Congress, for the draft treaties published by WIPO in late August 1996
contained language that, if adopted without amendment at the diplomatic conference in
December, would have substantially implemented the U.S. digital agenda, albeit with
some European gloss. Had this effort succeeded in Geneva, Clinton administration offi-
cials would almost certainly have then argued to Congress that ratification of the treaties
was necessary to confirm U.S. leadership in the world intellectual property community
and to promote the interests of U.S. copyright industries in the world market for informa-
tion products and services.
Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 89, at 373-74; see also LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT,
supra note 14, at 129 (suggesting that, because of domestic resistance, Commissioner Bruce Lehman
of the United States Patent and Trademark Office "decided to attack the problem the other way
around... [and] focused his attention on getting his agenda adopted by the WIPO member nations,
reasoning that when the United States signed the treaty, Congress would be obliged to adopt imple-
menting legislation in accord with the White Paper's recommendations").
206. WTO would be another possible forum. In the case of members of the European Union,
Brussels would be a usual forum.
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that these pressing international standards were unlikely to have existed
in the first place had the initiating country not "outsourced" the legisla-
tive process.
Even if the domestic legislature were able to resist the temptation of
introducing harmonizing legislation, these laws might still enter the
country in the form of customary international law when a sufficient
number of countries have adopted the controversial provisions in their
bilateral or plurilateral agreements and have expressly and consistently
recognized these provisions as legal norms governing their state conduct.
Although Congress may override these customary laws through legisla-
tion, the potential of their influence on the domestic legislative and judi-
cial processes and their ability to shape international discussion are not to
be ignored.
Moreover, the international agreements and the network of bilateral
and plurilateral treaties might affect the country's international obliga-
tions by "form[ing] the context for" the interpretation of treaties the
United States has signed.07 Because of the increasing overlap between
intellectual property and other issue-areas,08 governments and interna-
tional organizations increasingly look to these agreements as part of the
overall framework in an effort to avoid future conflicts in international
obligations. In United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act,
for example, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel noted the need "to seek
contextual guidance... when developing interpretations that avoid con-
flicts within this overall framework, except where these treaties explicitly
contain different obligations.' 20 9 In short, an international anticircum-
vention regime is not only harmful to importing less developed countries,
but also to the developed exporters, like the United States.
If that is not enough, the United States' obligations under the free
trade agreements may make it difficult and costly for the country to re-
duce protection later when it finds that the anticircumvention regime has
overprotected. As Anupam Chander reminded us recently:
FTA [free trade agreements] obligations, it must be remembered,
generally apply equally to the United States. Thus, it is possible that
the United States could run afoul of its own FTAs. The FTAs are not
term-limited, though they do permit withdrawal. Should we con-
207. See Ruth Okediji, TRIPS Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 585, 602-04 (2001).
208. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law 40
U.C. DAVis L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstractid--914606 (discussing the "intel-
lectual property regime complex"); Symposium, The International Intellectual Property Regime
Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. I (forthcoming).
209. Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 6.70,
WT/DS/160/R (June 15, 2000). For discussions of the dispute, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie,
The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the Formation of Copyright Law, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 733 (2001); Laurence R. Heifer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPS and
Economic Analysis of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).
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clude in the future that the DMCA anti-circumvention rules are too
constricting, we will have to renegotiate the FTA, flout the FTA, or
conform to an uncongenial rule. Our FTA partners may often lack
the internal economic incentive to seek to enforce the FTA's strict
anti-circumvention terms (though they may take it as a license to re-
duce their own anti-circumvention excess), yet they may seek to en-
force the FTA once partnered with interested multinational corpora-
tions engaged in rent-seeking.
2 10
III. FOUR OBSERVATIONS
As we plan for the future, it is important that we take heed of the
disagreements described in Part I and the various concerns articulated in
Part II. This Part provides four observations, which I hope will provide
some helpful guidance toward the development of the next generation of
DRM systems and the supporting legal regime. These suggestions also
seek to find more common ground between the many stakeholders in the
DRM debate.
A. Entrenched Laws and Lock-in Effects
Laws can be politically entrenched. Once entrenched, amending
them would be difficult even if they had proven to be ineffective or
harmful. A case in point is the Directive 96/9/EC of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases ("Directive"), 21' which created a sui generis right in the pro-
ducers of nonoriginal, noncreative databases to harmonize protection
throughout the European Community.2 12 The European Commission
recently evaluated the Directive for the first time and found empirically
that the Community benefited very little from the ten-year-old Direc-
tive.21 3 In fact, the Directive might have harmed the publishing and da-
tabase industries in the European Union.2 14
210. Chander, supra note 137, at 207.
211. 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
212. Id.
213. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIRST EVALUATION OF DIRECTIVE 96/9/EC
ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES (2005) [hereinafter DATABASE DIRECTIVE
EVALUATION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemalmarket/copyright/docs/databases/
evaluation reporten.pdf; see also James Boyle, Two Database Cheers for the EU, FT.COM, Jan. 2,
2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/99610a50-7bb2-1 1da-ab8e-0000779e2340.html (discussing the
report). For an interesting exchange concerning the EU Database Directive among James Boyle,
Thomas Hazlett, and Richard Epstein, see James Boyle, A Natural Experiment, FT.COM, Nov. 22,
2004, http://www.ft.con.cms/s/4cd4941 e-3cab- 11 d9-bb7b-00000e25 11 c8.html.
214. As the report stated:
According to the Gale Directory of Databases, the number of EU-based database "en-
tries" was 3095 in 2004 as compared to 3092 in 1998 when the first Member States had
implemented the "sui generis" protection into national laws. More significantly, the
number of database "entries" dropped just as most of the EU- 15 Member States had im-
plemented the Directive into national laws in 2001. In 2001, there were 4085 EU-based
"entries" while in 2004 there were only 3095.
DATABASE DIRECTIVE EVALUATION, supra note 213, at 24. Although the Directive aimed to create
a level playing field between U.S. and EU database industries, the report found that "[b]etween 2002
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Notwithstanding these disturbing findings, the Commission pro-
vided three reasons for the retention of the Directive.21 5 First, the Com-
mission "has received strong representations from the European publish-
ing industry that 'sui generis' protection is crucial to the continued suc-
cess of their activities. 216 As the Commission recognized in the report,
"the attachment to the new right is a political reality that seems very true
for Europe., 217 Second, a repeal of the sui generis right "would require
withdrawing, or 'reverse,' legislation and that might reopen the original
debate on the appropriate standard of 'originality.' 2 8  Similarly, a re-
formulation of the scope of the right would "require the Community leg-
islator to revisit the compromise underlying the two-tier protection intro-
duced by the Directive., 219 Third, "[r]emoving the 'sui generis' right and
thereby allowing Member States to revert to prior forms of legal protec-
tion for all forms of 'non-original' databases that do not meet the thresh-
old of 'originality,' might be more costly than keeping it in place. 22°
Troublesomely, these three reasons can also be used to explain the
retention of an ineffective anticircumvention regime. One can hardly
deny that the beneficiaries of the regime-say, developers of DRM sys-
tems-would prefer to retain the status quo. It is also undeniable that
revamping the regime would be costly and would require a reassessment
of where to strike the balance between proprietary interests and public
access needs. While the legislatures of less developed countries might
reason differently from the European Commission and be more protec-
tive of the public interest, it is unlikely that these countries would be in a
better position to resist pressure from the content industries and their
supporting developed countries.
To make things worse, laws that seek to manipulate technology may
create lock-in effects.22' As Dan Burk noted, the DMCA "confers upon
content owners a new exclusive right to control not only access to tech-
and 2004, the European share decreased from 33% to 24% while the US share increased from 62%
to 72%. The ratio of European/US database production, which was nearly 1:2 in 1996, has become
1:3 in 2004." Id. at 22.
215. In addition to maintaining the status quo, the Commission provided three other policy
options: (1) repeal the Directive, (2) withdraw the sui generis right, and (3) amend the sui generis
provisions. See id. at 25-27 (discussing the policy options); see also Boyle, Two Database Cheers
for the EU, supra note 213 (criticizing the fourth policy option of maintaining the status quo).
216. DATABASE DIRECTIVE EVALUATION, supra note 213, at 24.
217. Jd. at 25.
218. Id. at 6.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 27.
221. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 568 (2005) [hereinafter Burk, Legal and Technical Stan-
dards] (noting that "like any other interoperable computer technology, DRM will tend toward a
single standard, and simultaneously toward whatever concerns over monopolization or restraint of
trade that come with such network effects"); Wagner, supra note 35, at 1122 (stating that "[t]he
direct manipulation of technology could serve to 'lock-in' an unfortunate set of circumstances, could
forestall developments that might lead to more socially beneficial arrangements or even have more
general unintended spillover effects on technological change.").
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nologically protected works, but also .. .to control ancillary technolo-
gies related to content protection., 22 2 Indeed, the statute grants
broad power to dictate technological format and interoperability. The
very concept of a secure or managed digital environment contem-
plates that only approved or certified interoperation will occur: Un-
approved devices or applications potentially compromise the security
of the system. This type of interoperability control is a version of the
technical standards problem that has been identified in other com-
mentaries of computer technology. 22
3
If these laws were entrenched, they would harm society more and might
even hinder the modernization efforts of many less developed countries.
In addition, the existing anticircumvention regime has stifled en-
cryption research worldwide by making it difficult for researchers to
conduct and publish their research. As Joseph Liu pointed out, "even
though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and
publish some of their research under the DMCA without significant prac-
tical risk of criminal or civil liability, the DMCA significantly affects the
manner in which that research is conducted., 224 The regime has also had
the unintended effect of reducing incentives to create stronger and better
DRM systems-something copyright holders need to protect their intel-
225 Ntoalectual assets. As a National Research Council study warned us a few
years ago,
[i]t is ... possible that anticircumvention laws will be interpreted by
distributors not as incentives to use effective protection measures but,
rather, as incentives to do just the opposite-use insufficiently tested,
possibly weak protection technology, and increase reliance on the po-
lice and the courts to punish people who hack around it. This would
222. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 102, at 1132.
223. Id. at 1138; see also WILLIAM W. FISHER, 111, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW,
AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 172 (2004) (contending that if "[t]he proposal of the record
and movie companies that manufacturers of electronic equipment be obliged to embed encryption
systems in their products [were] ... adopted, it would limit the technological options available to the
manufacturers"); Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 619 ("More and more, manufactur-
ers of hardware and software platforms use DRM components to prevent competitors from develop-
ing and marketing competing platforms. In particular, DRM technologies and anti-circumvention
regulations are used to create proprietary interfaces to the platform, thereby foreclosing entry into
the platform market.").
224. Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 501, 503 (2003) [hereinafter Liu, DMCA and Scientific Research]; see also Peter K. Yu, Is Anti-
Piracy Law Stifling Cybersecurity Innovation?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 20 (discussing how
the DMCA has undermined cryptography and cybersecurity).
225. See, e.g., DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 705 (recalling the following
conversation: "I remember one conversation, 'How good are these solutions?' Answer: 'Pretty
good.' I come back: 'Nine months to break.' 'Mmm, maybe six."') (remarks of Professor David
Farber, who recently retired from the University of Pennsylvania); Wagner, Reconsidering the
DMCA, supra note 35, at 1126-27 (stating that the DMCA "will significantly suppress the incen-
tives to use, develop, and distribute anticircumvention technologies of any kind" and that "the lasting
contribution of the DMCA to the copyright law is as a set of rules that stabilized, moderated, and
encouraged relatively weak forms of DRM").
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result in some cost shifting: Instead of owners and distributors pay-
ing for good technology to protect their property, the public at large
would likely pay for a greater portion of this protection through the
law-enforcement system, although some of the increased costs in en-
forcement may be bome by the antipiracy efforts of the various in-
formation industry associations.
226
While there is no doubt that antitrust and unfair competition laws-
assuming they exist in the relevant countries-may be used to curb mar-
ket abuse by copyright holders and technology developers, commentators
seem to agree that exceptions are still needed if DRM research is to be
improved and if stronger and better DRM systems are to be developed.2 27
Such exceptions may have to be more encompassing and be extended
beyond encryption research "to recognize [other] legitimate reasons for
circumventing technical measures, such as to engage in research about
non-encryption-based watermarking technologies and to analyze com-
puter viruses or worms.' 228
In sum, the the decision to introduce the anticircumvention regime
needs to "be guided not by speculation, but by what is known'"229-
including those lessons from the DMCA experience. As Professor Kerr
and others wrote cautiously about the choice Canada faces:
TPM [technological protection measures] and DRM technologies are
still in relatively early stages of development, and new business
models for the delivery of digital information products are still being
beta-tested. Moreover, state of the art TPMs are still unable to dis-
tinguish between infringing and non-infringing uses. Consequently,
TPMs are currently unable to provide selective access to works in
situations in which such access would not result in copyright in-
fringement.
Given all of the above, it is perhaps too early to predict whether
the legal protection of TPMs is in fact necessary to the success of
mass markets for digital works. It is perhaps also too early to deter-
mine whether the failure to adopt such measures would ultimately
prove to be injurious to such markets. In fact, we do not even know
whether the legal protection of TPMs might actually undermine the
226. DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 312. For a discussion of how the cryptology and
security communities work, see generally id. at 313-18.
227. See, e.g., Liu, DMCA and Scientific Research, supra note 224, at 537 (stating that "a
broader exemption under the DMCA for encryption research.., would do a superior job of ensuring
that basic scientific research is left unaffected by the DMCA"); see also Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy, supra note 44, at 524 (arguing that the DMCA "should be
amended to provide a general purpose 'or other legitimate purposes' provision to avert judicial
contortions in interpreting the statute").
228. Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42.
229. Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 76; see also id. at 45 (suggesting that "Canada could choose
not to confer additional legal protection to TPMs and simply allow them to flourish or fail in an
unregulated environment until such time as there is more compelling evidence of a need to legis-
late").
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very aim of the TPM strategy by retarding the research and develop-
ment of newer, more secure TPMs and other innovative means of dis-
tributing digital information products, thereby leading to sub-optimal
consumption.
230
What Professor Kerr and his colleagues stated is true not only for
Canada, but for all other countries that have yet to introduce an anticir-
cumvention regime or to ratify the WIPO Internet Treaties. After all,
there has not been a significant reduction of the availability of digital
copyrighted materials in those countries that have not done so-Canada
being a very good example. 23' Nor has there been a significant increase
in the availability of digital copyrighted materials in those countries that
have ratified the treaties or introduced anticircumvention legislation.
B. DRMv. TPM
It is important to distinguish between DRM and TPM--digital
232
rights management systems and technological protection measures.
While the latter focuses narrowly on mechanisms used to protect copy-
righted contents, such as passwords, encryption, digital watermarking,
and other protection techniques,233 the former includes a larger set of
technological tools that not only protect the content, but also monitor
consumer behavior and facilitate payment for content usage.2 34 If DRM
systems are to be properly designed, they should not only protect the
copyrighted works from unauthorized access but also accommodate im-
portant interests of users and future creators. After all, as Stefan Bech-
told reminded us, "[n]othing in the 'nature' of DRM requires that DRM
be only used for restricting access to protected content or suppressing
fair use privileges. Properly understood, DRM is a much more neutral
technology than commonly acknowledged.
235
The distinction between DRM and TPM and the reduced emphasis
on protection are important because exceptions and limitations in the
230. Id. at 42.
231. Thanks to Jeremy deBeer for this suggestion.
232. Accord Kerr, supra note 124 (stating that "[ilt is useful to distinguish between TPMs and
DRMs"); see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 26 (describing DRMs that do not utilize TPMs). As
Professor Kerr explained, "[w]hile TPMs are designed to prevent copying, DRMs are designed to
manage copying by using various automation and surveillance technologies to identify content and
technologically enforce certain licensing conditions. More and more, DRMs will be used to manage
all rights reserved by content owners/providers usually on a take-it-or-leave-it basis." Kerr, supra
note 124.
233. See generally DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 153-76 (discussing technological
protection); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 13-23 (describing the various TPMs that can be used to
control access to, and use of, copyrighted works).
234. "A trusted system is a system that can be relied on to follow certain rules. In the context
of digital works, a trusted system follows rules governing the terms, conditions and fees for using
digital works." Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 139 (1997).
235. Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 602 (footnote omitted).
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copyright regime are just as important as the rights themselves.236 If we
equate DRM with TPM and consider DRM systems as "copyright
boxes, ''237 we are likely to lose sight of the important interests of users
and future creators as well as the legitimate rights they have traditionally
enjoyed. In doing so, we will also privilege the protection of rights over
the maintenance of exceptions and limitations. An overemphasis on
TPM may even backfire on content providers, because products that in-
clude many restrictions-or, as Hal Varian put it, "cripple-ware" 238-are
unlikely to be attractive.
In a symposium at Boalt Hall, Lawrence Lessig noted the additional
distinction between DRM and DRE (digital rights expression).23 9 To
Professor Lessig, the ability to express what rights the author chooses is
just as important as a system that manages those rights. What he did not
mention (but is likely to agree with2 40) is that, if we are to ensure that
DRM systems truly reflect the historical bargain struck in the copyright
system, we need to build into them not just holder rights, but also con-
sumer rights.24' Otherwise, as Pamela Samuelson put it, a DRM system
would become a "digital restrictions management" system that focuses
on permissions alone.242
236. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996) (noting that exceptions and limitations are "just as important as
the grant of the right itself').
237. STEFIK, supra note 164, at 55 (1999) (describing trusted systems as "copyright boxes").
238. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 707 (terming this type of technological
protection measures as "cripple-ware" because "[i]t inherently reduces the value of the product")
(remarks of Professor Hal Varian of the School of Information Management and Systems at the
University of California at Berkeley); see also Marc Fetscherin, Evaluating Consumer Acceptance
for Protected Digital Content, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 301, 315 (stating
that the consumers' frustrations over "the restrictions placed on how they can use content they
own... are enough to encourage piracy").
239. See DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 728 (stating that "[t]he Creative Com-
mons believes that we need to distinguish between this idea, DRM, and this idea, DRE") (remarks of
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford Law School).
240. Cf LESSIG, CODE, supra note 22, at 127 (introducing the concept of "copy-duty---the duty
of owners of protected property to make that property accessible").
241. See STEFIK, supra note 164, at 101 (stating that "[p]ublishers and consumers alike will be
better served if publishers use trusted systems in a way that recognizes and responds to legitimate
consumer expectations-for example, by creating digital contracts that preserve traditional notions
of fair use"); Armstrong, supra note 196 (observing that "the efficacy of any DRM system for pro-
tecting fair use depends in large measure on the extent to which the system grants parties other than
the copyright holder.., a say in whether any individual use, or category of uses, will be permitted");
Bechtold, Digital Rights Management, supra note 161, at 363 (stating that "[f]or an emerging infor-
mation society, the goal should not be a DRM environment which protects the legitimate interests of
rights holders only, but a symmetric DRM environment which protects the legitimate interests of
both rights holders and users"); Dam, supra note 54, at 411 (contending that, "[flor content provid-
ers, workable technological arrangements to accommodate fair users would be a win-win solution");
Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42 (stating that "[i]f DRM systems were
about digital management of rights, they would need to be designed so users could express their
rights under copyright, too").
242. See id. (noting that DRM "technologies are not really about the management of digital
'rights' but rather about management of certain 'permissions' to do X, Y, or Z with digital informa-
tion"); id. (stating that "[a]n alternative phrase for DRM is 'digital restrictions management,' given
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In the past few years, the content, computer, and home electronics
industries devoted a considerable amount of effort in developing TPM.
It is high time that they start thinking about the next generation of DRM
systems that would include digital rights language to facilitate the ex-
pression of both consumer rights and holder rights.243
C. Machine-Interpretable Noninfringing Uses
It is important to distinguish between machine-interpretable and
machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses. The fact that the scope and
boundaries of these uses, such as the fair use privilege, are uncertain and
that software code at the current state of technology may not be able to
capture the full range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright sys-
tem does not mean that we should not build legitimate uses into the
244DRM systems.
Consider, for example, the fair use privilege, "an elusive legal doc-
trine" that Judge Learned Hand has described as "the most troublesome
in the whole law of copyright., 245 So far, commentators have pointed out
the considerable mismatch between technology and this legal doctrine.
As Edward Felten noted, "[f]air use is one of the starkest examples of the
mismatch between what the law requires and what technology can do.
Accurate, technological enforcement of the law of fair use is far beyond
its use by copyright industries to restrict user rights"). As Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia ob-
served:
Current digital rights management (DRM) systems take a very limited view of the set of
rights they need to manage. Typically, they make decisions using a closed-world as-
sumption: Only actions explicitly authorized by content owners or their delegate(s) are
allowed, and the only "rights" are those explicitly granted by them and presented to the
DRM system. Most DRM systems do not even acknowledge the possible existence of
rights other than the content owner's to license a particular work.
Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM Systems,
COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61, 61.
243. See Susanne Guth, Rights Expression Languages, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT,
supra note 2, at 101-12 (discussing digital rights expression language); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at
27-28 (discussing Extensible Rights Mark-up Language (XrML)); Stefik, supra note 234, at 140-41
(discussing digital rights language).
244. See generally Burk & Cohen, supra note 45 (proposing a mixed fair use infrastructure that
includes automatic fair use defaults and key escrow elements); Bygrave, supra note 124, at 446
(explaining the need to "build[] mechanisms into the systems' architecture which preserve, where
possible, consumer anonymity, and which allow for pseudonymity as a fall-back option where ano-
nymity is not feasible for legal or technical reasons"); Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at
609-16 (discussing how to build intellectual privacy into the design of DRM technologies); cf.
Sklyarov Symposium Transcript, supra note 62, at 853 (stating that "[the] idea that tools are not able
to distinguish between what is a fair use and what is not a fair use, and therefore we just have to
outlaw fair use altogether, somehow gets short shrift") (remarks of Robin Gross, former attorney
with the Electronic Frontier Foundation).
245. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 552 (1939) (Hand, J.); MARSHALL
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 10.02, at 470 (4th ed. 2005) (stating that the fair use
privilege is "an elusive legal doctrine, reputed to be the most troublesome in copyright law"); see
also Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle, supra note 71, at 121 ("Fair use has always been a
problematic concept within copyright law. Although it is an important defense against a claim of
copyright infringement, its precise boundaries have never been clear.").
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today's state of the art and may well remain so permanently. 246 Indeed,
as he described colorfully, "[a] DRM system that gets all fair use judg-
ments right would in effect be a 'judge on a chip' predicting with high
accuracy how a real judge would decide a lawsuit challenging a particu-
lar use. Clearly, this is infeasible with today's technology. 24
7
While Professor Felten is right that software codes may not be able
to fully capture the fair use privilege-at least with the current state of
technology-his concerns will be greatly alleviated if we assume that
software codes can capture only some of its benefits under the fair use
privilege. Put differently, instead of looking at the glass as half empty,
we can consider it half full. As Barbara Fox and Brian LaMacchia, both
software architects from Microsoft, maintained:
[The limitation that no one can mathematically model fair use, as it is
understood today,] should not stop us from attempting to identify a
useful subset we might approximate in code. That is, we can take a
purely pragmatic engineering approach to what is on its face an "irre-
sistible force meets immovable object" paradox: Focus first on de-
fining and modeling a useful subset of fair use rights in some policy
language, then add these expressions to the policy evaluators of
DRM systems.
248
Congress, thus far, has been satisfied with intermediate technologi-
cal fixes. For example, although the DMCA mandates automatic gain
control copy technology for analog videocassette recorders, it includes
restrictions on the use of encoding to prevent or limit consumer copy-
ing.249 Likewise, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 requires that
246. Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at
57, 59. Similarly, Professor Samuelson noted:
Thus far, digital rights expression languages (RELs) lack semantics to allow the expres-
sion of concepts like fair use. DRM cannot accommodate user rights without REL vo-
cabularies capable of expressing them. Even if RELs developed semantics to express
user rights, content owners may abjure expressing them unless forced to do so by law or
competition.
Samuelson, DRM (and, or, vs.) the Law, supra note 41, at 42 (footnote omitted); see also Burk &
Cohen, supra note 45, at 56 (stating that "[a]t least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights
management code that approximates both the individual results of judicial determinations and the
overall dynamism of fair use jurisprudence"); Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 31 (stating that "the
technologies employed by DRMs are not yet sufficiently sophisticated to mirror the law of copyright
because TPMs themselves remain incapable of distinguishing between infringing and non-infringing
uses of digital works"); Reese, supra note 108, at 629 (stating that "[tiechnological protection meas-
ures that control reproduction or performance of a work, however, are unlikely to be well calibrated
to the actual contours of, for example, copyright owners' reproduction or public performance
rights").
247. Felten, supra note 246, at 58; see also Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 55 (expressing
their pessimism over the ability of "system designers ... to anticipate the types of uses that would be
considered fair by a court"); id. at 59 (stating that "[a]t present, only human intelligence, reviewing
the unique circumstances of a particular use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair").
248. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 242, at 62. For a recent comparative assessment of the
existing and proposed DRM systems in relation to its ability to protect fair use, see Armstrong, supra
note 196.
249. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k) (2004).
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digital audio recording machines be equipped with a Serial Copy Man-
agement System to provide copyright and generation status information
and to prevent the recording devices from producing a chain of perfect
digital copies through "serial copying. ' '250 None of these provisions is
close to replicating the fair use privilege, but they at least strike some
balance between proprietary interests and public access needs in the digi-
tal environment.
The limited scope of this Article does not allow me to fully describe
how I would build noninfringing uses into the DRM systems. However,
this section offers a brief sketch of what a more balanced DRM system
would look like. As I mentioned earlier, it is important to distinguish
between machine-interpretable and machine-uninterpretable noninfring-
ing uses. Under this proposal, software code would be used to accom-
modate machine-interpretable noninfringing uses, while the determina-
tion of the machine-uninterpretable noninfringing uses would remain in
the province of courts. As technology advanced and computer pro-
gramming became more sophisticated, DRM systems would be able to
accommodate more noninfringing uses. The domain of machine-
interpretable noninfringing uses would therefore expand, leaving fewer
and fewer copyright matters to courts.
One may compare this proposal to prior efforts in developing fair
use guidelines in the United States, which have thus far been largely un-
successful.25 1 Unlike those efforts, however, this proposal seeks to create
a continuous process that may alleviate some of their shortcomings. To
better understand my proposal, consider the core minimum approach
advocated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in
the human rights area. That approach, which inspired the proposal here,
was set up primarily to help countries fulfill their obligations under the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
times of resource constraints.252 In General Comment No. 3, the Coi-
250. Id. § 1002.
251. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Educational Fair Use in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Pho-
tocopy Freely, 60 U. PiTT. L. REv. 149, 160 (1998) (noting that, "[tihough Congress specifically
declined to incorporate these Guidelines into the Copyright statute, courts have generally held (and
publishers have gleefully conceded) that educational photocopying that meets the Guidelines consti-
tutes fair use of copyrighted works"); Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of
Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 701 (2001) ("One can only find failure in guidelines that
have missed their constructive goals and served destructive ends. The vast range of parties with an
interest in proper application of fair use have been poorly served by existing guidelines, and they
would be better served had the guidelines never existed."). For a comprehensive discussion of the
development of fair use guidelines, see id.
252. Article 2(1) of the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights pro-
vides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, in-
cluding particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
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mittee stated that "a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction
of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is
incumbent upon every State party., 253 The interpretive comment did not
stop there, however. It continued to state that, once countries have satis-
fied this core minimum obligation, they have to take "deliberate, con-
crete and targeted" steps towards the full realization of the rights in the
Covenant.254
While the Committee was concerned with physical and economic
resource constraints concerning the implementation of international hu-
man rights obligations, we are struggling with technical resource con-
straints regarding our ability to design DRM systems that capture the full
range of exceptions and limitations in the copyright system as well as the
dynamic nature of many copyright doctrines.25 5  A core minimum ap-
proach therefore will allow us to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of noninfringing uses. For example, we
can begin by "allowing users to extract a certain number of bits, or dis-
play the work for certain periods of time, or partially perform the work a
certain number of times., 256 As technology improves-and more techni-
cal resources become available, just like the availability of more physical
resources in the human rights context-we can strive to achieve full re-
alization of these exceptions and limitations. By developing DRM sys-
tems to accommodate as many noninfringing uses as technology allows,
this process will help approximate the rights consumers have tradition-
ally enjoyed in the physical space.
One concern with the core minimum approach, as Dan Burk and
Julie Cohen suggested, is that such an approach would encourage mini-
malist interpretation of important safeguards and the creation of a right
ceiling. As they explained:
We are ... skeptical ... about the ability of negotiated defaults to
capture the full range of social benefit that more flexible legal stan-
dards allow. While these defaults sometimes might allow access that
ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 2(1) (emphasis added); see also UDHR, supra note 67, art. 22 (stipulat-
ing that "the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for [one's] dignity and the free de-
velopment of his [or her] personality" are to be realized "in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State").
253. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature of
States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Par. 1) 1 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/94bdbaf59b43a424c 12563 ed0052b664?Opendocument.
254. Id. 2; see also ICESCR, supra note 69, art. 2(1) (requiring each state party "to take
steps,... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures").
255. See, e.g., Besek, supra note 36, at 493 (stating that '"[f]air use by design' techniques...
[do not] reflect the dynamic nature of the doctrine"); Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 56 ("[Flair
use is a dynamic, equitable doctrine designed to respond to changing conditions of use. Pro-
grammed fair use functionality, in contrast, is relatively static.").
256. Burk & Cohen, supra note 45, at 55.
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would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the "safe har-
bor" concept is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair
use. We suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute
fair use-indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guide-
lines by rights holders that led to the collapse of the CONFU [Con-
ference on Fair Use] discussions. Moreover, in the case of the 1976
"safe harbor" guidelines for educational copying, rights holders, con-
tent users, and even courts have shown a deplorable tendency to act
as though the guidelines defined the outer limits of fair use. To the
contrary, such guidelines were intended to delineate fair use minima:
a floor rather than a ceiling. We are consequently reluctant to rec-
ommend an infrastructure based solely on the design of similar de-
faults into self-enforcing "lock-out" systems for fear that the "ceil-
ing" effect could be even more pernicious.
257
Professors Burk and Cohen are rightly concerned about minimalist
interpretation and the ceiling effect. Indeed, those issues have continued
to dominate discussion in the human rights context. In regards to the
core minimum approach, human rights activists have been particularly
concerned that "the identification of minimum core content will reveal to
State parties how little they have to do in order to be in compliance with
their obligations, and that States will do that minimum and nothing
more. ' 25s However, it is important to remember that Professors Burk and
Cohen did not reject the use of technology defaults. Rather, they were
skeptical that such use alone would give the necessary protection and
therefore added a key escrow system to complement those defaults in
their proposed mixed fair use infrastructure. As Professor Burk pointed
out later, their concern was mainly that "technological controls tend to be
relatively blunt instruments for control of digital content, unable to ac-
commodate copyright fair use without the re-introduction of human dis-
cretion. ', 259  Because courts under my proposal will still provide the
needed human discretion when they make determination of machine-
uninterpretable noninfringing uses, their concern will be greatly reduced.
Nevertheless, there still remains their concern about minimalist in-
terpretation and a broader question of how to build machine-interpretable
noninfringing uses into DRM systems. To alleviate their concern, we
need to be particularly cautious about the process through which we
build noninfringing uses into DRM systems. The fact that the process
may create an unwanted ceiling does not mean that we should not create
the process at all. Rather, it means that we need to be careful about the
design of the building process.
257. Id. at 57.
258. Audrey R. Chapman & Sage Russell, Introduction to CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A
FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 1, 9 (Audrey Chapman & Sage
Russell eds., 2002).
259. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards, supra note 221, at 551.
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To do so, we need to develop a process that brings together copy-
right holders, technology developers, consumer advocates, civil libertari-
ans and other stakeholders. To some extent, this process reminds one of
Mark Stefik's proposed Digital Property Trust, which "would be gov-
erned by representatives of the various stakeholders-including publish-
ers, trusted system vendors, financial institutions, lawmakers, librarians,
and consumers-and would interact in an appropriate and organized way
with governing bodies and law enforcement agencies in different coun-
tries.,, 26 0 The integrity of this process is particularly important in light of
the historical lack of direct consumer representation in the copyright
lawmaking process. Even today, "[n]ot all standards processes include
end user representation, and even in those that do, there is no assurance
that end user grievances, once aired, will prospectively shape the stan-
dards that are brought to market. 261
Representation, however, is not the only major concern regarding
the design of my proposed process. Although public choice scholarship
has widely criticized the lack of representation, there is surprisingly very
limited discussion about how legislatures have made laws without fully
understanding technological development. Indeed, laws tend to be
drafted by lawyers and lobbyists through a lengthy deliberative process
with only limited advice from technology developers in the form of
comments, congressional testimonies, and commissioned studies.262 As a
result, the drafters may not know exactly what can and cannot be done
technically. As Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a lawyer by train-
ing, recalled humorously, "I looked at the [DMCA] bill and I saw some
problems, but the bigger problem in retrospect that I see was, on the
260. Stefik, supra note 234, at 156. This proposal was later refined in STEFIK, supra note 164,
at 100-01. As he explained, "[iun DPT, fair use is treated as a licensed privilege analogous to a
driver's license, rather than as a legal defense. From a legal perspective, this is a substantial refram-
ing of the fair-use concept that takes into account the greater risks of misappropriation in the digital
arena." Id. at 100.
261. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 616. Indeed, "[m]any other DRM standards
projects utilize neither open standards nor open membership. These include the motion picture
industry's DVD Content Control Association, Microsoft's Next Generation Secure Content Base
project, Intel's LaGrande project, and a host of smaller private efforts to develop proprietary DRM
technologies." Id. at 616 n. 113.
262. In the past, Congress benefited from the assistance of the Office of Technology Assess-
ment, which was abolished in 1995. Among the studies conducted in the intellectual property area
were those concerning computer software, home copying, and intellectual property in the digital age.
See Pamela Samuelson, Toward a "New Deal "for Copyright in the Information Age, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 1488, 1499 n.48 (2002) (reviewing LITMAN, supra note 14) (listing intellectual property-
related studies conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment). In fact, Pamela Samuelson
suggested that Congress could promote public interest by "establish[ing] something akin to the
Office of Technology Assessment to provide it with independent advice about policy options when
legislating on intellectual property and other issues responding to challenges presented by new
technologies." Id. at 1499.
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committee, I was the tech expert. I mean we're in trouble when that oc-
curs. I'm a lawyer, not a techie.
263
To make matters worse, laws tend to be reactive and therefore lag
behind technological development. Even the DMCA, which David
Nimmer has characterized as "proleptic, 264 failed to anticipate the latest
technological developments. For example, in its first DMCA rulemaking
proceeding in 2000, the Copyright Office noted "[t]he merger of techno-
logical measures that protect access and copying does not appear to have
been anticipated by Congress. '265 As Part II described, Congress's in-
ability to anticipate these technologies and the courts' failure to uphold
the congressional intent has rendered the statutory distinction between
access-control and use-control technologies virtually meaningless. That
distinction has also created a difficult situation concerning region codes
used in DVDs and video games, because regional encoding, as Nimmer
pointed out, "constitutes neither an access control (inasmuch as buyers of
the disc obtain the lawful right to access it, at least under certain circum-
stances) nor a copying control (inasmuch as disabling the regional coding
does not implicate the copyright owner's rights as defined in the Copy-
right Act). 266
Likewise, even though one of the stated goals of the DMCA is to
reduce digital piracy, the drafters of the DMCA failed to anticipate the
extensive unauthorized copying problem created by file-sharing tech-
nologies. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reminded us in Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica v. Verizon Internet Services,2 67 "P2P software was 'not even a glim-
mer in anyone's eye when the DMCA was enacted.'
268
In light of these deficiencies, the process needs to include technol-
ogy developers-not just as experts for their testimonies, but as partici-
pants who will help distinguish machine-interpretable noninfringing uses
from their uninterpretable counterparts and then build them into DRM
systems. As Fox and LaMacchia noted:
The two open issues in establishing a safe harbor are: how to create
machine-interpretable expressions that adequately model a set (or
subset) of fair use rights; and how to get the stakeholders (content
owners, DRM system builders, and Congress, as the representative of
263. Zoe Lofgren, Edited Transcript of the David Nelson Memorial Keynote Address: A Voice
from Congress on DRM, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 495, 498-99 (2003).
264. David Nimmer, Back From the Future: A Proleptic Review of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855 (2001).
265. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,558 (2000).
266. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 146, § 12A.06[D][2].
267. 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
268. Recording Indus. Ass n of Am., 351 F.3d at 1238 (quoting In re Verizon Internet Servs.,
Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 38 (D.D.C. 2003)).
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the people's interest in the social bargain of copyright) to work to-
gether on defining the boundaries of a subset of fair use rights that
would be safe to implement. 269
While the first issue is important and remains a vital project for
270technology developers, my proposal focuses mainly on the latter-
how to get the stakeholders to work together on defining the boundaries
of a subset of noninfringing uses. To do so, one needs to have a dynamic
process. First, we need to allow technology developers to explain what
machines can and cannot interpret. While it is undoubtedly important for
technology developers to continue to improve the recognition of nonin-
fringing uses, my proposal uses the core minimum approach and relies
on existing technology.
The next step is for stakeholders to come to an agreement on the
minimum essential levels of noninfringing uses. As demonstrated by the
collapse of CONFU271 and other similar efforts and the continued rent-
seeking copyright lawmaking process, this part of the process is probably
the most difficult. While copyright holders will no doubt have a strong
interest in developing the next generation of DRM systems that consum-
ers will embrace, as well as in the migration of illegal downloaders to
DRM-compliant systems, it is na'fve to assume that they will easily come
to agreement with communications providers, consumer advocates, and
civil libertarians on the boundaries of noninfringing uses. Thus, the par-
ticipation of Congress or courts-either as a mediator or an adjudica-
tor-may be necessary. Under that scenario, noninfringing uses will be
built into the system using both the "by design" approach and the "by
mandate" approach.27 2
To make the process manageable, it is important that the discussion
is restricted to existing laws, including interpretation of statutes, case
law, and treaty obligations. Such discussion is already difficult enough,
even without introducing issues that have not been anticipated by Con-
gress and courts. In examining the exceptions and limitations, it is also
269. Fox & LaMacchia, supra note 242, at 63.
270. The vitality of this project is obvious. As Stefan Bechtold noted: "Whether a DRM
system respects fair use or not depends, in particular, on the design of the rights expression language
[REL]. If fair use privileges and the other legitimate interests of information users cannot be ex-
pressed in the REL, such interests simply do not exist with the DRM system." Bechtold, Present
and Future, supra note 3, at 608.
271. For discussions of CONFU, see Crews, supra note 251, at 626-35; Gregory K. Klings-
porn, Note, The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use Guidelines, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 101 (1999).
272. Cf Besek, supra note 36, at 491-94 (discussing both the "fair use by design" and "fair use
by mandate" approaches). As June Besek defined, "'[flair use by design' refers to situations in
which the design of a technical solution builds in some ability to take advantage of copyright exemp-
tions." Id. at 491. In contrast, "'[flair use by mandate' describes circumstances in which righthold-
ers are directed to enable non-infringing uses but not necessarily given specific instructions as to
how that should be done." Id. at 492.
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important that the participants explore customary usage in addition to
exceptions that have already been codified in the copyright statute.
273
Once the stakeholders have agreed on the minimum essential levels
of noninfringing uses, it is important for technology developers to recog-
nize these uses in software code. Should they encounter any problems,
the process will allow them to ask the stakeholders for clarification or to
explain the technological limitation so that the participants can recon-
sider the coding request. This step is not completed until the agreed-
upon noninfringing uses have been built into DRM systems. Then the
cycle repeats itself, and more noninfringing uses will be built into the
system as technology advances.
There are at least two potential objections to this approach, in addi-
tion to the usual criticism that the approach is unable to capture the full
spectrum of noninfringing uses, to which I responded earlier, as well as
the argument that the stakeholders can never reach a mutually acceptable
agreement. First, as Joseph Liu has noted with respect to the fair use
privilege,
if we actually tried to spell out, in the law, in a detailed manner, in-
stead of the four factors, what exactly copyright and fair use would
look like, I think you would soon find a statute that would begin to
resemble the tax code in its complexity because it would be volumes
and volumes and volumes of very detailed regulations depending on
who you are, why you're using it, which context, and all the rest.274
When this criticism is combined with Jessica Litman's criticism of
the incomprehensible nature of current copyright law, a tax-code version
of the fair use privilege seems very unappealing, even if it is interpret-
able by machines. 275 As Professor Litman noted, "We can continue to
write copyright laws that only copyright lawyers can decipher, and ac-
cept that only commercial and institutional actors will have good reason
to comply with them, or we can contrive a legal structure that ordinary
individuals can learn, understand and even regard as fair., 27 6 However,
Professor Liu only highlighted the complexity of the fair use privilege,
273. See Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 106 (explaining that some lawful personal
uses may not have been codified as exceptions in the copyright statute); see also Lunney, supra note
15 (discussing private copying in relation to the DMCA); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented
Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1525 (2004) (advancing a pattern-oriented ap-
proach to fair use decisions).
274. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 731-32 (remarks of Professor Joseph Liu
of Boston College Law School); see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575, 1637-38 (2003) (stating that "industry-specific rules and exceptions [in
the copyright model] have led to a bloated, impenetrable statute that reads like the tax code").
275. See LITMAN, supra note 14, at 145 (stating that "[t]he DMCA is long, internally inconsis-
tent, difficult even for copyright experts to parse and harder still to explain"); see also FISHER, supra
note 223, at 93 (describing the DMCA as "[a]n enormous, gangling, and poorly edited piece of
legislation").
276. Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 39
(1996).
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which is true with or without this proposal, while Professor Litman was
mainly concerned about whether humans could read and understand
copyright laws. Her concern, I suspect, would be considerably alleviated
if computers are to read and execute the "code." After all, computers
have handled far more complex application programs, and the Wide-
spread usage of tax preparation software strongly suggests the techno-
logical feasibility of this approach.
The second objection is that, even if we are able to build into the
system a subset of noninfringing uses under the copyright system, the
system will not work, because there is no guarantee that there will be
zero leakage in the system. As Richard Epstein noted, it is hard to find
an intermediate fix in the digital world, "because once one pristine copy
gets out, then there are a billion pristine copies that are out there., 277 As
far as DRM systems are concerned, "all it takes is 'one leak' to neutralize
a TPM entirely, '278 and this leak can come from anyone from anywhere
in the world.
Admittedly, this proposal would not address this problem. Al-
though it may take seventeen hours to reproduce the latest Harry Potter
novel 279-and significantly less if more perpetrators are involved-the
publisher's revenue stream can be significantly reduced as soon as that
reproduction becomes available on the computer. However, we have to
question whether it is realistic to expect perfect protection, just like we
have to question whether it is realistic, or even possible, to find perfect,
hacker-proof encryption technology. With more than six billion Internet
users in the world, 280 and many more in the future, there is always the
possibility of having "one pristine copy" being leaked to the public. 28' If
we are going to aim for a system that guarantees zero leakage, that sys-
tem may never be found.
Thus, the question cannot be whether we can prevent that copy from
being leaked to the public, but whether we can contain the leakage to
ensure reasonable compensation for copyright holders. This alternative
question makes a lot of sense, because copyright holders do not need to
capture the full social value of their creation and completely prevent free
277. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 755 (remarks of Professor Richard Epstein
of University of Chicago Law School).
278. von Lohmann, supra note 41, at 641.
279. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 755 (remarks of Jerry Berman of the
Center for Democracy and Technology).
280. Internet Usage Statistics-The Big Picture: World Internet Users and Population Stats,
http://www.intemetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
281. See BIDDLE ET AL., supra note 41 (holding the belief that "at least for some classes of
user, and possibly for the population at large, efficient darknets will exist"); Yen, supra note 71, at
691 ("[N]o law-not even a complete ban on circumvention technology-can guarantee the security
of copyright. Piracy has always existed, yet copyright-based industries have flourished."). But see
Besek, supra note 36, at 477 (noting that "[s]ome piracy has always been a cost of doing business,
but there comes a point at which it is realistic-and unfair-to expect paying customers to subsidize
widespread free use").
[Vol. 84:1
2006] ANTICIRCUMVENTION AND ANTI-ANTICIRCUMVENTION 73
riding.282 Indeed, zero leakage has never been a goal of copyright law,
which was introduced primarily "to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good" by allowing authors to obtain a reasonable return
on their investment.283
In sum, a two-step approach-technology first, then courts-seems
to be the best compromise we can have today, and it is worth considering
developing such a system as we explore the next generation of DRM
systems. As Charles Clark titled his well-cited chapter, "the answer to
the machine is in the machine. 284 As long as we do not need to give up
exceptions and limitations of the copyright system, using computers as
the first step seems to be very appealing.
From the standpoint of less developed countries, this approach is
even more attractive because it avoids the costly correction mechanisms
involved in other proposals, especially if the multistakeholder process is
set up as part of the legislative process (which already exists) and if the
software code used in DRM systems, or at least the specific portion con-
cerning the machine-interpretable noninfringing uses, is revealed. The
different laws and institutions that are involved in this process may also
help these countries tailor protection to their own needs, interests, and
goals.
Unfortunately, this proposal would not address my earlier concern
that a new anticircumvention regime might require consumers to pur-
chase end devices that support the technological measures employed. 285
Thus, the best option for many less developed countries is not to intro-
duce any anticircumvention laws at all, unless they have concrete evi-
dence that those laws would benefit the countries. However, if they have
no choice but to do so, either because of changing international norms,
external pressure, or benefits in other trade areas, this proposal-coupled
with technical assistance in circumvention tools and economic assistance
in purchasing new end devices-may provide an acceptable solution.
D. Market Responsiveness
Consumer interests are important, and the success of DRM systems
will depend on the satisfactory accommodation of these interests. It is
therefore no surprise that this Summit was entitled "From Creator to
Consumer: Working Together in the Digital World." When the old Nap-
ster was discussed in the file-sharing context, the service was often criti-
282. See discussion Part I.B.
283. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (quoting
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
284. Charles Clark, The Answer to the Machine Is in the Machine, in THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 139 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 1996).
285. Thanks to Michael Mireles for pointing this out.
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cized for its illegality and its unresponsiveness to the plight of artists and
consumers. As jazz artist Herbie Hancock noted:
So far, [Napster]'s even worse than the labels. On the way to making
millions for its owners and investors, Napster has yet to give any-
thing to artists other than the chance to spread their music, for free,
and whether they like it or not. Its supporters hide behind claims that
labels misuse artists and consumers, as if that entitled them to take
everything they want absolutely free. Excuse me, but just because
record executives give artists a bad deal doesn't mean that everyone
else can then go and do worse.
286
Regardless of what impression one has of the old Napster, one can
hardly deny that the service was appealing to consumers because it gave
them what they wanted. Apart from free (and often illegal) music
downloads, Napster also allowed consumers to find obscure music and
special remixes that were unavailable in the market.28 7 As I noted else-
where, "Napster succeeded because it supplied a market solution to an
emerging demand.... Shawn Fanning was inspired to create Napster by
his college roommate's frustration in searching for MP3s on the Web.
Napster responded to the market instead of chasing it."
288
The same can be said of DRM systems. Indeed, technology devel-
opers constantly have to deal with their systems' market responsiveness.
As Emery Simon, an attorney with the Business Software Alliance, re-
called:
The software industry has used DRMs for twenty-five years. It goes
through a cycle. The software industry tightens up the DRMs and
consumers scream, because they can't do very much with the soft-
ware when it fails, or they want to reload it. Companies loosen up on
the DRM, and the piracy goes way up, and then they tighten up on it.
That has been the cycle, and that continues to be the cycle, and we're
reconciled to that cycle. What we do in that cycle is we abandon
technologies that consumers hated the worst. I'll give you an exam-
ple. There is something called a dongle, a little piece of hardware
that people attach to the back of the PC with which the PC has to
shake hands in order to run the software. People hated it. Nobody
uses a dongle anymore. So yes, there are DRMs that are hated by the
marketplace, and are taken out of the marketplace in response to the
market. 2
89
286. Herbie Hancock, Preface to JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE
NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC, at xvii, xviii (2001).
287. See Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, supra note 8, at 699-701 (explaining why
record companies may not have the rights to release all of the content consumers found on the old
Napster and other file-sharing engines).
288. Id. at 742.
289. DRM Symposium Transcript, supra note 53, at 750 (remarks of Emery Simon of the
Business Software Alliance); see also Kerr et al., supra note 45, at 31 (recalling that "in the early
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Indeed, technology developers, and those who incorporate DRM
systems into their products, are constantly struggling with the trade-offs
between cost and effectiveness and between protection and inconven-
290ience. If the systems are too complicated and restrictive, they would
jeopardize the user experience and make content inaccessible. The
costly technology also would raise product prices, thereby reducing con-
sumer demand. However, if the systems are too simple and easy to
break, they do not provide sufficient protection for copyright holders.
Consider region codes used in DVDs and video games. Designed to
direct machines to allow access to the protected content only if the prod-
uct was coded to be played in the authorized geographic area, these spe-
cial codes are important to copyright holders, because they allow movie
producers to segment the international market. In doing so, they enable
the scheduling of DVD releases based on the timing of the theatrical re-
lease or the progress of the relevant promotional campaign.291 They also
facilitate price discrimination and allow rights holders to respond to dif-
ferent licensing arrangements and local censorship regulations.
From the standpoint of consumers, however, region codes can be
annoying, especially to frequent travelers or foreign film or anime afi-
cionados, whose interests have yet to generate a big enough market to
facilitate domestic distribution. When these consumers make a purchas-
ing decision, they not only have to decide whether they want the prod-
ucts, but also where they want to enjoy the products and whether they
have the needed playback device to do so. After all, products that are
purchased in Asia (with a region code of 2, 3, 5, or 6) are very unlikely
to be playable in machines purchased in the United States (with a region
code of 1).292 Indeed, the use of region codes has led the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission to investigate whether such
usage would breach the Trade Practices Act.293
1980s many companies that sold software applications employed a form of copy protection to pre-
vent the floppy disks on which their applications were sold from being copied" and that "[m]assive
consumer resistance to this approach led to the abandonment of this TPM and yet software compa-
nies subsequently found the risk of illegal copying to be within acceptable limits").
290. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 43, at 153 (noting "inherent trade-offs between the
engineering design and implementation quality of a system on the one hand and the cost of building
and deploying it on the other"); id. at 164 (stating that "[a] good mechanism is one that provides the
degree of disincentive desired to discourage theft but remains inexpensive enough so that it doesn't
greatly reduce consumer demand for the product"); von Lohmann, supra note 4 1, at 643 (noting that
"[w]here alternative channels exist, customers of legitimate services will respond to restrictions
imposed by TPMs by seeking out darknet channels").
291. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Mistrust-Based Digital Rights Management 15 (U. Chicago
Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper Series, No. 291, 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract-id=899155.
292. The six region codes are: "1. USA and Canada; 2. Europe, Middle East, South Africa and
Japan; 3. Southeast Asia and East Asia; 4. Central and South America, Mexico, Australia and New
Zealand; 5. Eastern Europe, Indian subcontinent, Africa, North Korea and Mongolia; and 6. China."
Besek, supra note 36, at 457 n.284.
293. Caitlin Fitzsimmons, Restricting DVDs 'Illegal' Warns ACCC, AUSTRALIAN IT, Mar. 27,
2001, at 33; see also Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 32, at 615 (noting that "[t]he more deeply
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Today, it is common for the content industries to describe how digi-
tal technologies have greatly reduced their market. While this claim may
be true to some extent, one question they rarely raise is whether consum-
ers are, in fact, purchasing the same products-with the same usage
terms and conditions. If they do not, one may have to question whether
the market demand was reduced because of the digital challenge or be-
cause of the increased usage restrictions that have made the product less
appealing. Indeed, the adverse impact of these restrictions on consumers
has been so severe that Representative Rick Boucher (D-Va.) introduced
the Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005 to amend the Federal
Trade Commission Act to ensure proper labeling of copy-protected com-
pact discs.
294
As DRM systems become increasingly deployed to protect copy-
righted works, rights holders need to be conscious of the trade-offs be-
tween cost and effectiveness and between protection and inconvenience.
They need to be careful about what usage restrictions or protection
mechanisms they put on the products, especially if such mechanisms
could harm the users' computers (think Sony rootkit!). They also need to
be mindful of laws that are introduced to protect consumers. If they fail
to do so, the new technologies not only will harm their markets by reduc-
ing customer satisfaction, but will bring them legal troubles outside the
intellectual property area.
Interestingly, if the content industries and technology developers
begin to take market-related concerns more seriously, they are also less
likely to adopt draconian technological protection measures that would
severely limit consumer access to the product. As Douglas Lichtman
reminded us, "a point [that is] often missed in discussions of DRM [is
that] content owners do not necessarily want airtight control over their
work, and so there is no reason to expect that they will use extreme
forms of DRM even if extreme forms were feasible. 295 Moreover, if
some content providers find that greater access would be in their own
interest, they may want to encourage other content providers to do so
through industry standards.296 To compete for customers, some content
embedded in software and hardware DRM functionality becomes, the harder it will be to avoid by
purchasing noncompliant equipment"); see also Bechtold, Present and Future, supra note 3, at 629
(noting that "[b]oth the European and the Australian competition authorities have investigated
whether the regional code management system in DVD players is used to overcharge European and
Australian customers for DVD discs compared to U.S. customers"); see also Cohen, DRM and
Privacy, supra note 32, at 615 (noting that "[t]he more deeply embedded in software and hardware
DRM functionality becomes, the harder it will be to avoid by purchasing noncompliant equipment").
294. H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005). For a brief discussion of similar legislation in the 108th
Congress, see Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative
Proposals Relating to Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 317, 319-20 (2005).
295. Doug Lichtman, Defusing DRM, IP L. & Bus., Feb. 2006, at 24.
296. As Kenneth Dam explained:
[S]ome content providers may find that fair use buttons or related devices are in their
own interest and therefore may want to encourage other content providers to use similar
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providers may also find it worthwhile to reduce user restrictions in their
products or to facilitate greater transformative uses.297
CONCLUSION
In the future, DRM systems are likely to be used in products that are
important to us in our digital life. They will appear in not only an Adobe
e-book or an Apple iPod, but also in our car, our school, our kitchen, and
298
our living room. There is a growing tendency for the content indus-
tries to invoke copyright liability whenever their works were used with-
out authorization. There is also an increasing trend for manufacturers of
household products that incorporated software code to use anticircum-
vention laws to protect their products from competition. If we do not
have balanced DRM-related laws and good DRM systems that accom-
modate consumer interests and if we allow rights holders to invoke intel-
lectual property principles in every instance of unauthorized circumven-
tion of DRM systems, we are creating a recipe for disaster. Intellectual
property protection is important, but not more important than how we
live our daily life. As a senior official from the Department of Homeland
Security reportedly reminded the entertainment industries following
Sony's recent rootkit debacle, "[i]t's very important to remember that it's
your intellectual property, it's not your computer.,
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devices. If so, the development of industry standards is likely to be a preferable and more
flexible approach, allowing different kinds of content providers to approach the fair use
issue in quite different ways, thereby avoiding the deficiencies of a one-kind-fits-all leg-
islative or rule-making approach.
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297. Id. at 411 (stating that "it is probable that some kinds of content providers, at least in the
realm of ideas, will want to facilitate transformative uses so long as acknowledgment of their own
work is made").
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